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<1988) Directed by Dr. Dale L. Brubaker. 208 pp. 
Religious challenges to the American public school 
curriculum charge that public schools either inhibit or 
advance particular religious beliefs. If an allegation is 
litigated, state and federal courts at all levels have 
relied on the Lemon tripartite test in order to determine 
when a first amendment violation exists. This test asks 
what is the purpose and the effect of the activity, and 
does it involve the state in excessive entanglement? 
This study has analyzed how various courts have 
interpreted and applied the test in 17 selected cases in 
which it was alleged that a particular statute or activity 
either advanced or inhibited religion. The areas of 
challenge to the public schools included prayer/moments of 
silence, balanced treatment, secular humanism, sex 
education, and compensatory education. 
This researcher concludes that courts have consistently 
used the Lemon test in ruling on allegations of religious 
activity. Based on the application of the test, officials 
can predetermine what the purpose, effect, and entanglement 
of a statute or activity will be, in addition to developing 
guidelines which will avoid a first amendment violation 
prior to implementing a questionable activity. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A phenomenon rarely experienced by other institutions, 
public or private, is the bombardment of criticism directed 
toward the American public schools by both external and 
internal forces. Education endures this criticism because 
the general public claims ownership of its schools for a 
number of reasons which reflect the tradition of lay 
control. The public pays taxes to support schools, entrusts 
its children to the schools for hundreds of hours each year, 
and relies on the schools to provide an educated citizenry 
which is capable of fostering and sustaining the American 
system of democracy. 
For these reasons, the public wishes a voice in the 
operation of the American educational system. Sometimes 
that voice emanates from a lone person; at other times, the 
voice emerges from several individuals or groups. 
Polarization often occurs when the schools do not respond 
favorably to the expectations or requests made of them by 
these diverse voices. This is especially true if the party 
or parties who issue the demand<s> are prepared to forge 
ahead to attain the desired goal or outcome. 
The central issue is one of control. Who has the right 
to control the education of children? The professional 
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educator who is charged with the responsibility of 
instructing students in those areas which will render them 
literate and responsible citizens? The parent who feels a 
moral obligation to Instill his values and beliefs in his 
children, while seeking to exclude all other conflicting 
ideologies? The local school board whose members often 
have agendas of their own? Or the legislature which 
responds to the wishes of numerous constituencies by passing 
statutes which affect schools, even if the possibility 
exists that such legislation could be Interpreted to be In 
violation of an Individual's constitutional rights? 
Traditionally the authority to control the curriculum 
within the schools lay with the local school board. Today, 
however, this curriculum is being challenged from many 
sides. The Protestant fundamentalists provide one such 
source of challenge. Prior to 1974, conservative and 
fundamentalist parents frequently felt helpless when they 
were faced with making their concerns known to officials of 
the public education system. 
They saw themselves as victims of a liberal, 
morally decadent larger society that had left 
behind their old fashioned attitudes about 
religion, morality and social behavior.! 
The year 1974, however, brought about an 
opportunity for change. During that year parents in 
Kanawha County, West Virginia, successfully challenged 
the use of several textbooks in the public schools. 
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The success of the anti-textbook forces in Kanawha 
County gave conservatives around the country a new 
sense of confidence. They could control their own 
destinies and stop the tide of perceived 
immorality that threatened to engulf their 
children.2 
The fundamentalist movement, a power stucture supported by 
many internal single-issue groups, has had and will continue 
to have, tremendous impact on the schools. No longer can 
educators laugh it off, saying that the movement is a 
minority group comprised of ignorant fundamentalists led by 
pulpit-pounding, hel1-fire-and-brimstone preachers. Rather 
a highly organized body exists, led by extremely literate, 
well educated, vocal people who have command of vast 
dollars, control extensive media networks, support powerful 
political allies, and subsidize think tanks, while drawing 
national—and international—attention to its causes. 
"Protestant Fundamentalism has become a powerful, 
confident, and Important force."3 
Many groups challenge the public school curriculum, 
including members of this group. They raise many questions 
and insist upon answers. If the answers are not responsive 
to their wishes, the fundamentalists resort to the courts 
for legal redress of their complaints. What are those 
complaints? Among other things, the educational system is 
accused of advocating and fostering a religion called 
secular humanism, an umbrella term which refers to many 
areas of the school curriculum.4 Challengers decry the 
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teaching of evolution and instruction In sex education.5 
They are angry because they believe textbooks ignore the 
religious history of America.6 They want prayer in the 
schools, and a return to the Judaeo-Chr1stian ethics of 
their forefathers.7 
A second group which has challenged the public school 
curriculum is comprised of individuals who are opposed to 
any type of religious influence in the schools. 
Consequently, members of this group have challenged prayer,8 
moments of silence,9 Bible readings,10 and scientific 
creation ism.They assert that such activities are 
violations of their first amendment rights which guarantee 
separation of church and state. This group also seeks 
recourse in the courts. 
People for the American Way, a liberal organization 
that has appointed itself the watch dog of censorship 
attempts, recently reported its findings In its fifth annual 
report. During the 1986-87 academic year, it reported that 
there were 153 attempts to remove books from public 
institutions. Including schools and libraries. This 
represented a 21 per cent increase over the 1985-86 academic 
year, and a 168 per cent increase from the first report in 
1982.12 Many of these censorship attempts were premised on 
religious objections. 
When differences between parent and school system 
cannot be reconciled at the local school level, the courts 
i-
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often become the final arbiters of the controversy. Rarely 
does a month go by without some reference in the media to 
litigation that has resulted from religious objections to 
some aspect of the public school curriculum. These Judicial 
decisions are rendered In both state and federal courts. 
The bimonthly publication Newsletter on Intellectual Freedom 
tracks these challenges and subsequent lawsuits and provides 
systematic reporting of the outcomes. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem for this study was to identify and select 
appropriate court cases from the years 1982 - 1987, in which 
individuals or groups charged that the curriculum included 
prayer or suspect moments of silence, mandated balanced 
treatment of evolution and creation science, promoted the 
religion of secular humanism, and offered courses in sex 
education and compensatory education that were in violation 
of their • rellglous rights, because such materials either 
advanced the establishment of religion or prohibited the 
free exercise of religion. These cases would provide the 
basis for the analytical treatment of the Lemon tripartite 
test which is the focus of this study. 
The analysis of each case required a format that would 
reveal how a particular court applied the Lemon tripartite 
test in determining if a first amendment violation existed. 
Specifically, the courts were asked by petitioners to answer 
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the following questions, and the Lemon test was used in 
arriving at answers. 
—Can public schools legally institute moments of silence, 
prayer, and/or meditation? 
—Can the public schools require balanced treatment for 
scientific creation ism if evolution is taught as part of the 
regular curriculum? 
— Do the public schools, through the use of the established 
curriculum, promulgate the religion of secular humanism? 
—Can courses in sex education and compensatory education be 
offered if they infringe upon or promote individuals'" 
religlous rights? 
The Lemon tripartite test was established in Lemon v. 
Kyrisman. 13 At issue was the constitutionality of 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey statutes which granted aid to 
parochial schools by providing salary supplements and by 
allowing the schools to purchase services, specific 
textbooks, and secular Instructional materials. 
In spite of several restrictions governing use of the 
money, such as a per pupil expenditure level, the insistence 
upon the secular character of the activity for which aid was 
being provided, and the nature of the courses, the 
plaintiffs still challenged whether the state had a right to 
be involved in the business of sectarian education. 
Relying on tests from two previous cases, 3oard 
gf Education— v fen14 f and Walz v. Tax Commission's, the 
Supreme Court developed, refined, and prescribed a 
three-part test that would be applied in subsequent 
litigation in which a violation of religious rights was the 
allegation. This test would ultimately be known as the 
Lemon test and was comprised of three questions. 
—Did the statute have a secular purpose? 
—Did the principle of the statute either advance or inhibit 
religion? 
—Did the statute require or foster excessive entanglement 
between church and state?'6 
An answer of "yes" to any one of the questions was 
sufficient to declare the statute unconstitutional. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Several terms which were used repeatedly throughout 
this paper are generic, and are used by the media and lay 
people whenever they discuss education. Therefore these 
terms require definition for consistency of understanding. 
For the purpose of this paper, the following definitions 
were used: 
—Censorsh ip. A process designed to limit or restrict 
access to books and materials which may result in: 
i> suppression of use, 2) removal of books or 
materials from the library or classroom, or 3) 
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limiting access of library and instructional 
materials.17 
—Chal1enge. An attempt by an individual<s) or group<s> to 
exert change on some aspect of the public school curriculum. 
—Curriculum. Courses and activities which occur on school 
grounds during the regular school day, beginning with the 
time students arrive on the campus until leaving at the end 
of the school day. Use of this definition allowed the 
writer to examine court decisions which were not related to 
specific course content, such as moments of silence, prayer, 
etc., but precluded examination of such activities as 
commencement or athletic events. 
--Fundamental Protestantism. A collective phrase 
designating a broad generic group which consists of several 
fundamental Protestant sects usually associated with 
conservative political Issues and advocating religion in the 
schools.20 
—Instructional materials. Those materials such as library 
books, audio-visua 1 materials, workbooks and other 
supplementary items which are utilized In a learning 
si tuat ion. 
—Sectarian. The Random House College Dictionary defines 
sefii as a "body of persons adhering to a particular 
religious denomination" and sectar1 an as "of or pertaining 
to sectaries or sects."18 Sectarian refers to things and 
people that have a religious connotation. 
9 
—Secular. "Of or pertaining to worldly things or to things 
that are not regarded as religious, spiritual, or sacred."19 
—Textbooks. Those books selected by some recognized 
selection process for use in curricular offerings in the 
school. 
PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
During the administration of President Ronald Reagan, 
1980-1988, there has been evidence of a resurgence of a 
strong conservative philosophy with advocates making their 
ultimatums calling for prayer in the schools, a return to 
the basics, balanced treatment in biological sciences, 
emphasis on the Importance of the traditional family, and 
tuition credits/vouchers which aid private schools. By 
1988, President Reagan had nominated approximately 
one-fourth of the federal judges sitting on the bench, and 
the tenor of the courts was beginning to change. Some 
courts appear to be adopting a much more lenient position 
with regard to religion in the schools.21 Does this 
represent a significant trend for future court opinions? 
If a more lenient trend occurs, it implies an impact on 
the public schools which could result in far reaching 
changes in their organization and governance. School 
districts in which there is a desire to instill Christian 
tenets Into the curriculum will be seeking ways to adopt 
policies which allow prayer, instruction in creation 
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science, the elimination of secular humanism, and the 
establishment of school sponsored religious clubs. Other 
school districts which practice strict separation of church 
and state will be seeking ways to continue to comply with 
the mandates of the first amendment while attempting to 
address the demands of a constituency that wants change. 
Most legal cases which involve a challenge to the 
curriculum because of religious objections allege a 
violation of the first amendment establishment clause or the 
free exercise clause. The establishment clause states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting the 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.22 
The free exercise clause 
separates government and religion so that we can 
maintain civility between believers and 
unbelievers as well as among the several hundred 
denominations, sects, and cults that thrive in our 
nation, all sharing the commitments to liberty and 
equality that cement us together.23 
Whenever there is a question concerning religion in the 
schools, one or both of these clauses will be invoked. 
The purpose of this study is to review the literature 
which pertains to religious activities in the public 
schools, and to analyze selected court cases from recent 
years in the lndepth scrutiny of the application of the 
Lemon tripartite test The significance of the study Is in 
providing guidelines to assist public school officials in 
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determining an appropriate course of action for the future 
with regards to religion In the schools. 
METHODOLOGY 
Standard legal research techniques were employed in 
order to identify and locate significant cases. 
The United States Supreme Court Digest supplied the 
titles and citations for the body of litigation which 
reached the United States Supreme Court. Wesfs Education 
Law Digest was used to locate additional appropriate cases 
which were decided In United States Courts of Appeals, 
District Courts, and State Appellate Courts. In initiating 
the research, the writer used the topic method of approach. 
The West Key Number System was utilized to locate the 
specific cases. Topics and key numbers included 
Constitutional Law, key numbers 84, 84.5, 90, 90.1 <1,8,9); 
and Schools, key numbers 76, 164, 165, 166, 167. 
Specifically, the key numbers associated with Constitutional 
Law referred to "Religious liberty and freedom of 
conscience, Freedom of speech and of the press, and Privacy: 
marriage, family, and sexual matters." The key numbers 
referring to Schools included such descriptors as "School 
libraries. Curriculum and courses of study. Religious 
instruction and reading of Scriptures, and Selection or 
adoption and change." From this search, a bibliography of 
selected cases was compiled. 
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The National Reporter System furnished the cases used 
in the study. The writer examined Corpus Juris Secundum for 
the principles growing out of the cases dealing with the 
research topic, and Shepard-'s Citations was used to update 
each case and provide a means for locating cases that might 
not have been found in the initial search. 
The applicable cases were read and classified into 
appropriate categories. Each case was subsequently analyzed 
to determine if it were applicable to the problem. To 
perform a consistent factual analysis of each case, the 
writer used the following four-part organizational pattern. 
1> What was the question posed in the suit? 
2) What was the decision? 
3) How was it reached? 
4 )  What were the implications of the d e c l s l o n ? 2 4  
Following the research of the primary sources, the 
writer conducted further research using secondary sources. 
for the years 1982 to 1987 to become familiar with any 
doctoral dissertations that might have treated a similar 
problem. "Social Science and Humanities" was the major 
category with "Education" as the sub-topic; the search was 
further refined to use of the descriptors, "censorship, 
legal, religion, and challenges." 
The Current Index to Journals in Education (Oryx 
Press), Volumes 14 to 19, Number 7, covered a time span from 
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January 1982, to July 1987, and was used to complete a 
bibliography of professional articles that had a bearing on 
the problem. The ERIC descriptors applicable to the topic 
consisted of "censorship, academic freedom, moral Issues, 
moral values, sanctions, religion, creationism, religious 
holidays, state church separation, textbook bias, textbook 
selection, curriculum, controversial Issues—course content, 
and legal problems." The Education Index, published by the 
H. L. Wilson Company, provided another resource for 
periodical information. 
The writer used card catalogs at the University of 
North Carolina - Asheville, the University of North 
Carolina - Greensboro, Western Carolina University, and 
North Carolina State University to obtain titles of books 
which pertained to the study. In addition, the researcher 
used the inter-library loan system to gain access to 
materials not housed in one of the above libraries. 
DELIMITATIONS 
This study was delimited to an examination of selected 
judicial decisions from appellate state courts, and court 
decisions coming from United States District, Appellate, and 
Supreme Courts from 1982 to 1987. With the large number of 
cases in which religion has been the focus, the writer 
arbitrarily chose not to address the concept of equal 
access, extra-curricular activities occurring after school 
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or in the evening, or such activities as commencement and 
athletic events. 
The character of the topic Itself posed further 
delimitations. Only cases which addressed challenges to the 
public school curriculum and In which Judges used the Lemon 
test to reach a decision were chosen for analysis. The 
areas in which the challenges occurred were specific. 
—Can the public schools illegally institute moments of 
silence, prayer, or meditation? 
—Can the public schools require balanced treatment for 
scientific creationlsm if evolution is taught as part of the 
regular curriculum? 
—Do the public schools through the use of the established 
curriculum promulgate the religion of secular humanism? 
—Can courses in sex education and compensatory education be 
offered if they Infringe upon or promote individuals'' 
religlous rights? 
Because of the vast number of cases involving religion 
in schools, the writer selected a particular time frame; not 
to do so would make for a very lengthy and unwieldy 
document. Therefore, she selected the time span of 1982 -
1987 for two reasons. The volume Censorship of Public 
1982. While this book did not deal solely with religion, 
the authors did treat significant court cases which had 
religious themes as the underlying challenge. In addition 
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to an extensive review of court decisions, one chapter was 
devoted to a review of the literature on censorship 
(including religious censorship) that began with early 
history leading to the sixteenth century, the beginning of 
America, and continuing to 1982. A second chapter offered a 
comprehensive treatment of the legal aspects of 
censorship.25 
The second reason for choosing this particular time 
span was the nature of the decisions rendered during the 
five years. During 1982 - 1987, the Supreme Court heard its 
first moment of silence/prayer case, and ruled on a balanced 
treatment statute. Several cases were filed charging that 
schools were advancing secular humanism as a religion. 
Parents contested the content of many textbooks. The 
decisions would have a bearing on the direction school 
boards and legislatures pursued in the future. 
In the two decades from 1965 to 1980, the Supreme Court 
chose to address very few of the appeals in public school 
cases In which religion was a point of contention. In fact, 
"only two opinions were rendered Involving the application 
of the religious clauses to public school issues."26 
Consequently public schools were not clear how far they had 
to go to accommodate free exercise rights without violating 
the establishment clause. Following 1982, however, the 
Court agreed to hear several such cases, among them, Val1 ace 
Vt . fCfeS.27 and Bender v. Wi 1 1 iamsport ,28 The initial 
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Jaffree decision was handed down on August 9, 1982, in U. S. 
District Court, and a number of cases were scheduled for the 
court dockets in the following five years. Thus, with the 
proliferation of litigation, the time from 1982-1987 offered 
the most substantive cases for study and analysis. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study includes an introductory chapter, three 
chapters which contain the methodology, a review of the 
literature, and the analyses of the selected court cases, 
and a final chapter which contains a summary of the findings 
concerning the application of the Lemon test in religious 
cases involving the public school curriculum, and 
recommendations, both to educators in practice as well as to 
researchers, for further study. 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
Legal decisions reflect an inverted pyramid. Initial 
precedent begins with a single case. With each new case, 
the base line becomes broader. Thus the initial case 
provides precedent for a second case, those two provide 
precedent for a third, and the progression continues. Each 
opinion reveals a JudgeCs)' interpretation of an event or 
series of events as it is based on preceding cases. 
Therefore, one is able to see how intertwined, convoluted, 
and dependent one case is upon another when they are viewed 
logically. The concept of "precedent" is the crystallzation 
of the quintessence of the judicial system. 
Legal research provided the basis for the design of 
this study, "Religious Challenges to the Public School 
Currlculumt Analysis of the Application of the Lemon 
Tripartite Test in Selected Cases from 1982 - 1987." The 
writer identified and located pertinent cases, which she 
subjected, in turn, to intense scrutiny and analysis for 
classification into appropriate categories. This analysis 
determined which cases were suitable for inclusion in the 
study. 
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The writer used primary sources whenever possible. 
However, she conducted additional research using secondary 
sources in order to Increase not only her understanding of 
the research topic, the application of the Lemon test in 
specified instances, but especially to familiarize herself 
with background for the study. The background investigation 
proved significantly important in the areas of 
constitutional history, religious fundamentalism, and the 
history of the Lemon tripartite test. 
PROCEDURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
Two inherently related major points of mutual Impact 
lay at the core of the research problem—religion and the 
public educational program. In order to initiate the 
research, the writer studied the list of West digest topics, 
and found two which were germane. The first topic. 
Constitutional Law, was chosen because the first amendment 
religion clauses would be involved in all of the selected 
cases. The second topic. Schools, was chosen because the 
purpose of the analysis of the cases was to determine how 
Judges applied the Lemon test in deciding cases whose foci 
were religious challenges to the public schools. 
The writer then reviewed the list of key numbers and 
picked out descriptors and numbers which would Identify 
cases. With this information, the researcher proceeded to 
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the various digests and compiled a bibliography of 
designated cases. 
The Unlled States Supreme Court Digest included the 
titles and citations for the body of litigation which 
reached the level of the United States Supreme Court. The 
American Digest System, including West-'s Education Law 
Digest. listed additional appropriate cases which had been 
adjudicated in United States Courts of Appeals, District 
Courts, and State Appellate Courts. 
The National Reporter System contained the cases used 
In the study. Shepard^s Citations updated each case and 
provided a means for locating cases that might not have been 
found In the Initial search. 
Following the research of the primary sources, the 
writer Investigated secondary sources. She reviewed the 
Comprehensive Dissertation Index for the years 1982 - 1987 
to determine If any doctoral candidates had treated a 
similar problem, and to ensure that this study would not be 
a replication of an already existing one. She found no 
dissertations of record that treated this particular topic 
or any other topic of similar vein. 
Ihfi—Current Index 3lq-. Journal s_-iiL_iIdy£alIi?D. was 
utilized to compile a bibliography of professional articles 
that had bearing on the topic. Education Resources 
Information Center (ERIC) added additional bibliographical 
sources. The Index to Legal Periodicals incorporated 
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entries to the articles found In the law publications. To 
provide assistance in understanding legal terms and 
concepts, the writer depended upon Black-'s Law Dictionary. 
The libraries located on the campuses of the University 
of North Carolina - Ashevllle and Greensboro, Western 
Carolina University, and North Carolina State University 
provided the books which were relevant to the study. In 
addition to the comprehensive libraries, the writer availed 
herself of the resources of the Buncombe County Law Library 
and the Transylvania County Law Library, as well as the 
Inter-library loan system. 
Through the review of the literature, in addition to 
reading magazines, periodicals, newspapers, and listening to 
television news and accounts, the writer Identified several 
specific areas of public concern which had led to litigation 
involving school systems. These included mandatory and 
voluntary prayer/moments of silence, secular humanism, 
balanced treatment of evolution and creation science, and 
courses in sex education and compensatory education. 
The decisions evolving from these legal encounters 
appeared on the court calendars between the years 1982 and 
1987, a five-year time span during which there was an 
increasing amount of litigation regarding separation of 
church and state as it pertained to the public schools.1 
The time appeared right to determine which direction the 
courts favored—if any. 
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To provide consistency in the technical analysis of 
each case, the writer noted the area of challenge and asked 
four key organizational questions: 
—What was the question posed in the suit? 
—What was the decision? 
—How was it reached? 
—What were the implications of the decision?2 
Histories, case commentaries, legal articles, pamphlets, 
bulletins, journals, periodicals, and newspapers were the 
object of additional attention as the writer explored the 
various nuances of the decisions. Singular attention was 
devoted to differences in the opinions of establishment 
clause experts when the clause was Interpreted In a narrow 
manner as compared to a broader Interpretation. 
The writer discriminately analyzed the cases to discern 
the process by which the Judiciary applied the Lemon test. 
A common denominator was established to ensure consistency 
and reliability in drawing conclusions about the application 
of the test. The formulation of several questions and their 
subsequent answers would accomplish this, as well as augment 
the aforementioned organizational questions: 
—Was the Lemon tripartite test applied in its entirety to 
any of the cases, and/or was any one prong of the test 
weighted more heavily In providing the basis for reaching a 
decision?3 
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—Did the courts shift from lesser to greater accommodation 
of religion in schools? 
—In order to avoid the charge that an activity was 
promoting religion, did the inclusion of an excusal option 
or voluntary participation provision affect the outcome in 
any of the cases? 
—Collectively, how have the courts ruled on prayer in 
schools, including moments of silence? 
—How did the area of challenge, i.e., voluntary prayer or 
evolution/creation science. Influence and/or affect the 
outcome of the decision? 
—What are the major trends that appear in secular humanism, 
sex education, and compensatory education cases? 
The information gleaned from the answers to these 
questions furnished the means with which the writer later 
summarized the findings, made conclusions concerning the 
application of the Lemon test in religious cases involving 
the educational program in public schools, and offered 
recommendations, both to educators in practice as well as to 
researchers, for further study. 
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II 
*The lower courts heard at least five cases between 
1982 and 1985 dealing with just moment-of-si1ence 
situations: Beck v. McElrath. 548 F.Supp. 1161 <M.D. Tenn. 
1982); Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools. 557 F.Supp. 1013 
(D.N.M. 1983); Mav v. Cooperman. 572 F.Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 
1983); Jaffree v. Wallace. 705 F.2d 1526 <11th Cir. 1983); 
Walter v. West Virginia State Board of Education. 610 
F.Supp. 1169 (S.D.W.Va. 1985). 
2 H. C. Hudgins, Jr. and Richard Vacca, Law and 
Education; Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottesville: 
Michie, 1979), p. 46. 
3The writer is aware that a violation of one prong 
makes it unnecessary to address the remaining two. Epperson 
v. State of Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97 (1969) and Stone v. 
Graham. 449 U.S. 39 (1980). However, have the courts done 
so for purposes of clarification? 
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the colonization of the United States, the school 
has been a rallying place for the community. Citizens feel 
strongly about their schools, and each individual personally 
justifies the existence of the school. Because the citizen 
claims ownership, he perceives his rationale for schools as 
the appropriate one; consequently he will vehemently defend 
his purpose, often to great length, regardless of the 
consequences. 
This philosophy of ownership, "I can dictate to and 
control what I own," has led to the Increased conflict which 
is occurring within the public schools. However, this 
perception is the antithesis of the legal interpretation of 
what schools should represent. Justice Frankfurter, writing 
in the McCollum decision, stated the school's role very 
clearly: 
Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful 
agency for promoting the cohesion among a 
heterogeneous democratic people, the public school 
must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in 
the strife of sects. The preservation of the 
community from diverse conflicts, of Government 
from pressures by religious groups, of religion 
from censorship and coercion however subtly 
exercised, requires strict confinement of the 
state to instruction other than religious, leaving 
V.; J , / * -
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to the individua1's church and home, 
indoctrination in the faith of his choice.1 
The number of attacks on the public schools has 
increased alarmingly since 1980. Targets have included 
specific courses, library books, textbooks, audio-visual 
materials, and teaching methodologies. Critics have accused 
the schools of promulgating religion, as well as Inhibiting 
the free exercise of it. 
The pupil, who is the very reason public schools exist, 
is trapped in the middle of the conflict. Is the child who 
hears and is taught one thing in the home and in church, 
exposed to other ideas in school? Is the child a "victim" 
who is denied the right of access to divergent thinking? Or 
Is he the "victim" because someone charges the schools are 
infringing on his religious freedoms? 
Schools reflect the pendulum swing of history, 
including Judicial decisions. As long as schools are an 
extension of the populace which supports them, school people 
must remember that schools represent al 1 the people, and 
litigation becomes a mirror of the values of the times. 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The question of separation of church and state as it 
applies to public school education usually arises when the 
focus is on the first amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, which reads as follows: 
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Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government in a redress of grievances.2 
Because the United States Is the home for many 
different religions, sects, and cults, all must coexist on 
the same soil within a secular setting. "This is the 
American Heritage, and while harmony usually prevails, it Is 
sometimes a heritage of friction."3 When this harmony is 
disrupted, the first amendment becomes the vehicle for 
correction or elimination of alleged wrongs resulting from 
two basic premises; is the state advancing religion and is 
the state prohibiting the practice of religious beliefs?4 
[T]he religious ban is complete, barring 
government from aiding and enhancing or inhibiting 
and hindering religion. In other words, with 
respect to religion, government must be neutral.5 
Regardless of this ban, problems continue to surface where 
the government and public agencies are Involved. In the 
educational context, four general types of constitutional 
problems have arisen: 1> attempts to instill religion as 
part of public school activities, curricular or otherwise; 
2) attempts to divert public funds into the support of 
parochial schools; 3) conflict that inevitably arises 
between a pupil's or parent's claim to free exercise of 
religion and the curricular requirements of a school.6 
The fourth area of concern is a growing recognition on the 
part of educators and the public at large that school 
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textbooks, In an attempt to comply with the directives of 
the first amendment, have largely failed to address the role 
of religion in American history."'' One tends to think of 
the United States as the bastion of religious freedom. 
After all, many of the colonists settled in America to 
pursue their religious beliefs free from the persecution so 
many had endured in Europe. Such Is not the case. Many 
examples of state maintained establishments of religion can 
be found in the history of the colonies prior to the 
American Revolution. Five southern colonies recognized the 
Anglican Church as the church of state, while three New 
England colonies gave preferential treatment to the dominant 
Congregational faith. Only four colonies did not show some 
type of religious establishment—Rhode Island, Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.8 
Following the American Revolution, opportunities 
existed for states to eliminate the church/state 
relationship. However, few legislatures availed themselves 
of the opportunity to do so.9 In fact, most states 
continued to tax citizens for the benefit of churches. 
Only Virginia provided for the complete separation 
of church and state. Virginia's advanced position 
was largely due to Thomas Jefferson, James 
Madison, and Baptists who refused to pay taxes for 
a state-supported church.10 
Both Madison and Jefferson relied heavily for their 
philosophical leanings upon the teachings of John Locke. 
This philosophy became succinctly clear following the 
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Virginia debate over a bill which was introduced by Patrick 
Henry that would require individuals to register by 
denomination and pay taxes In support of that 
denomination.11 Two important documents resulted from the 
debate which defeated the proposed legislation. The first 
was Jefferson's fill] fjac Establishing Religious Freedom. 
enacted into law in 1786, which said: 
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place or ministry 
whatsoever. . .but that all men shall be free to 
profess, and by argument to maintain, their 
opinions in matters of religion. . .To compel a 
man to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is 
sinful and tyrannical.*2 
The second of the documents was James Madison's 
Speaking against Patrick Henry's bill, Madison made a number 
of cogent remarks, delineating the danger should the 
proposed legislation be passed. 
Because the Religion then of every man must be 
left to the conviction and conscience of every 
man; and it is the right of every man to exercise 
It as these may dictate. This right Is in its 
nature an unalienable right. . .Because it is 
proper to take alarm at the first experiment on 
our liberties. . . Because the bill violates the 
equality which ought to be the basis of every 
law. . . 
Because the proposed establishment is a departure 
from the generous policy, which offerCs] an asylum 
to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation 
and Religion. . . 
Because It will destroy that moderation and 
harmony which the forbearance of our laws to 
intermeddle with Religions, has produced among its 
several sects. . .Because, finally, "equal right 
of every citizen to the free exercise of his 
T 
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Religion according to dictates of conscience" Is 
held by the same tenure with all our other 
rights.13 
When the founders of the United States met in 
Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 to draw up the 
Constitution, they felt they had a knowledge of man. This 
knowledge was utilized to help them draft a Constitution 
suitable to a fledgling government. 
To them a human being was an atom of 
self-interest. They did not believe in man, but 
they did believe in the power of a good political 
constitution to control him.14 
Consequently, this Constitution was not written as the 
great embodiment of liberty. According to Hofstadter, the 
concern of the authors of this document was property, not 
1iberty. 
In fact, it was the opponents of the Constitution 
who were most active in demanding such vital 
liberties as freedom of religion, freedom of 
speech and press, Jury trial, due process, and 
protection from "unreasonable searches and 
seizures."i5 
And thus the Bill of Rights, including the first amendment, 
was born. 
The first amendment provides the basis on which many 
legal decisions have been reached with regards to human 
rights.16 Cases reach federal courts through two primary 
avenues. First is an alleged violation of an individual's 
protected right, privilege, or immunity. Second is a 
question of violation of a state or federal law as it 
relates to a violation of federal constitutionality.17 
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Frequently the questions are posed in diametric opposition 
to each other. In the book Censorship of Public School 
Library and Instructional Material, the authors categorize 
four types of constitutional questions. What conflicts 
arise when the various rights are in opposition to each 
other? 
"the right of students to read and receive information" 
"the right of parents to oversee the education of their 
chi1dren" 
"the right of school boards to make educational 
decisions" 
"religious freedom of Individuals"18 
When does religious freedom for one become an Infringement 
of religious freedom for another? The government can 
neither establish and/or support a religion, nor can it do 
anything which would prevent any Individual from "free 
exercise" of his religious beliefs. 
The Everson case established the principles for 
interpreting the establishment clause. Justice Hugo Black, 
writing for the majority, stated: 
The establishment of religion clause of the first 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion over 
another. Neither can force nor influence a person 
to go to or to remain away from church against his 
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief 
In any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or 
nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or 
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small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach 
or practice religion. Neither a state or the 
Federal Government can openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the 
words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by laws was intended to 
erect a "wall of separation between Church and 
State."19 
The Abington School District v. Schempp and Murray v. 
Curlett cases helped define the free exercise clause. 
[The free exercise clause] recognizes the value of 
religious training, teaching and observance and, 
more particularly, the right of every person to 
freely choose his own course with reference 
thereto, free of any compulsion from the state. . 
The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many 
times here, withdraws from legislative power, 
state and federal, the exertion of any restraint 
on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is 
to secure religious liberty in the individual by 
prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil 
authority. Hence it is necessary in a free 
exercise case for one to show the coercive effect 
of the enactment as it operates against him in the 
practice of his r e l i g i o n . 2 0  
However, the balancing test for the free exercise 
clause, which was outlined in Wisconsin v. Yoder21. is 
different from the tripartite test used in establishment 
clause cases. The first question in determining violation 
of free exercise Is whether or not the activity which the 
plaintiff claims is being violated Is a sincerely held 
religious belief. Second, if it Is a sincere belief, is it 
being violated by government action and to what extent? The 
final question is whether the action "serves a compelling 
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Interest that Justifies the burden Imposed on the free 
exercise of relglous beliefs."22 
The difference between the two clauses would appear to 
be that "a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is 
predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause 
violation need not be so attended."23 
The manner in which the first amendment is Interpreted 
has a significant bearing on the direction the decision 
takes. The establishment clause 
protects a person from having his religious 
identity controlled, changed, or influenced by 
government and that means protecting those persons 
who currently have a religious Identity and those 
other persons who do not.24 
A broad interpretation of the first amendment proscribes a 
strict prohibition of any aid to parochial groups regardless 
of the Impartiality or equity of such aid. In other words, 
it admonishes absolute neutrality toward all things 
religious. This has been the historical tradition of the 
United States Supreme Court.25 
A narrow Interpretation of the first amendment 
presupposes the addition of the letter "a" before the word 
"religion." 
Under this interpretation government may not 
recognize a single religion or a church as the 
religion of America, and also government would 
equally be prohibited from preferring one or more 
religions or churches over others. But, the point 
is that government would be permitted, under this 
interpretation, to have the specific purpose and 
primary effect of equally aiding all religions or 
all churches or religious groups.26 
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As of 1987, the majority of the Court continued to 
interpret the first amendment in the broad sense. 
The establishment clause means that government Is 
neutral In matters of religion. It does not favor 
one religion over another, many religions over 
some, or al1 religions over none.27 
CURRICULUM IN THE SCHOOLS 
The public schools in the United States were 
established to provide an educated citizenry who would 
follow and maintain the principles of democracy. Every 
government, especially one which represents a pluralistic 
society, seeks Its self continuation and self preservation, 
and in a republic an educated electorate is fundamental.28 
Education Is an attempt by the community to form 
beliefs and habits that are consonant with the 
highest standards of knowledge and the best ideals 
of behavior.29 
Schools are established by state law or state 
constitutions with authority and control to operate and 
regulate vested in the local authorities. Taxes are levied 
in order to maintain schools, and children are entitled to 
attend school free of charge. 
David and Kern Alexander list three fundamental 
assumptions that apply to church/state Issues. 
First, education Is a benefit to the entire 
society and the legislature has the power to tax 
all for support. . . 
Second, education provided by the state must be 
secular and individual religious beliefs should 
not be Inhibited. . . 
The third assumption, that the state can compel 
all parents to provide their children with a 
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minimum secular education, is essential to the 
concept of general mass education.30 
Arval Morris points out the likelihood of 
indoctrination but defines its appropriate use as being one 
that is plausible and consistent with the ultimate goal. 
In one sense, indoctrination means the careful 
teaching of the fundamentals of a branch of 
knowledge as the basic principles have come to be 
accepted by scholars in that field of knowledge. . 
[Tlhe subject matter should be taught within an 
open atmosphere of challenge and criticism by the 
students. The goal is a critical and curious 
mind.31 
When schools offer only one side of an issue, or make 
inadequate information available, negative indoctrination 
occurs.32 
To hold that schools are to promote one or a few 
officially approved view or views, is to hold the 
totalitarian position, and that position is 
inconsistent with a democratic society.33 
Generally, local school boards are given the authority 
to determine final curriculum, as long as it includes those 
certain subjects mandated by the state legislature. 
However, situations may arise when legislatures or boards 
will knowingly "attempt to Indoctrinate pupils into blindly 
holding only one point of view."34 The first is what is 
known as "official indoctrination," when a legislature or 
board requires uncritical instruction in a specific area. 
The second, "official ignorance," occurs when a legislature 
or board refuses to allow instruction in a specific area. 
The third occurs when a teacher selects some type of 
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instructional material that is later challenged; therefore, 
the board attempts to restrict its use.35 This very state 
empowerment provides the school board with the opportunity 
either to advance or prohibit religion, both of which are in 
violation of the first amendment. 
America is an amalgam of numerous religious 
convictions, so it is no wonder that there are so many 
attempts to change the curriculum because It Is not 
compatible with the beliefs of one or more groups. However, 
In general, secular activities and instructional 
offerings in public schools need not be altered to 
accommodate religious beliefs. Indeed the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the curriculum must ngt 
reflect the preferences of one or all religions.3® 
(emphasis in original) 
While religious activities such as prayer and Bible 
reading had been prevalent In American schools for many 
years, "increasing secularization and pluralism made such 
practices unsustainable.1,37 The Supreme Court during the 
early 1960s, handed down landmark decisions that established 
precedent. These decisions assist in settling disputes and 
provide interpretation for similar situations.38 
In order for one to discuss religion in the schools, it 
is necessary to define it. 
Any Individual or group belief Is religious if it 
occupies the same place In the lives of Its 
adherents that orthodox beliefs occupy in the 
lives of their adherents. Four characteristics 
should be present: 1) a belief regarding the 
meaning of life; 2) a psychological commitment by 
the individual interest (or if a group, by the 
members generally) to this belief; 3) a system or 
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moral practice resulting from adherence to this 
belief; and 4) an acknowledgement by Its adherents 
that the belief Cor belief system) is their 
exclusive or supreme system of ultimate beliefs.39 
There exists a proper place for religion in the 
curriculum, however, and that is to study about religions 
and how they have impacted on our cultural heritage, which 
includes history, art, music, and 11terature.40 Parents, 
however, have the obligation to instruct their child in the 
religion of their choice. "The central purposes of public 
schools are intellectual and civic. . .not religlous."41 
And the role of the teacher in teaching about religion "is 
to help students better understand faiths other than their 
own and the roles of religion in the life of their nation 
and that of other cultures."42 
Several authors have addressed curriculum and what It 
is, with the result that some definitions are broader than 
others. Reutter defines the curriculum as "encompassCing] 
all experiences provided for public school students under 
the aegis of public school authorities."43 This definition 
would include regular school activities, as well as all 
co-curricular and extra-curricular activities, on school 
grounds as well as off. That this definition has been 
adopted in challenging schools Is evident in such cases 
where individuals have challenged prayers before graduation 
ceremonies and athletic events.44 
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Black's Law Dictionary defines curriculum as "The set 
of studies or courses for a particular period, designated by 
a school or branch of a school.""15 This definition Is more 
closely delineated because it specifically states "sets of 
studies or courses." Yet, it does not specify what is meant 
by period. 
Arval Morris uses still another definition, a two-fold 
one, encompassing both of the above. 
The term "curriculum" can be used in at least two 
senses. One sense refers to the studies 
prescribed for a given grade, the successful 
completion of which leads ultimately to a high 
school diploma. A second sense of the term refers 
to the whole life-experience program of the 
school.4S 
Morris also points out the existence of two distinct 
curricula, the stated overt one and the hidden curriculum.'1''' 
The first specifies the courses, the course content with its 
articulated goals, objectives, outcomes, and the prescribed 
textbooks which are to be used in order to accomplish this 
purpose. The second, the hidden, is the image, with its 
attendant nuances, that the school portrays by its example. 
If one accepts each of these definitions, one can 
accept Boles'' assertion "that almost every conceivable area 
of the public school curriculum has been challenged at one 
time or another someplace in the United States."''18 
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The function of curriculum is to instruct students so 
that they will be productive, contributing citizens. 
In the American democracy this means education 
that is directed toward producing a mentality in 
all students such that they can distinguish fact 
from value and can critically evaluate values and 
rationally choose their own .49  
This presents the dichotomy of opposing groups. On the 
one hand is the group which believes the school should be 
"Instilling and propagating certain proper and officially 
approved or tolerated ideas, beliefs and values."50 On the 
other hand are those individuals who believe the schools are 
responsible for teaching students to be critical thinkers 
who can make Intelligent, reasoned decisions for 
themselves.51 
Consequent 1y: 
As the American people have developed a national 
constitutional government based on the principal 
of separation of church and state, the public 
schools in the United States have been faced with 
developing a curriculum in a society of diverse 
re 11glous be 1i efs.52 
The authority to establish curriculum lies with the 
states, and while local authorities frequently have power 
granted by the state to prescribe curriculum, it can be 
retained at the state legislative level.53 That authority 
which is granted to the local school officials allows them 
to determine method, curriculum and textbooks, but as H. C. 
Hudglns points out, only as long as it does not conflict 
with state mandates.54 He further notes that when 
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curriculum authority is maintained at the state level, it 
may be vested in either state constitution or state statute. 
Although some state constitutions have provisions 
with respect to teaching specific subjects, state 
statutes are more explicit as to what shall be 
taught. Statutes may even provide for how a 
subject should be taught. Similarly, statutes may 
forbid the teaching of a specific subject.55 
The federal government has no direct control over the 
establishment of curriculum. However, It exerts tremendous 
indirect control as it expends billions of educational 
dollars through the use of grants made available to states 
so long as they agree to abide by certain regulations and 
condi tions.56 
Authority to establish curriculum, however, is not 
absolute and courts may Intervene when a question of 
Constitutional rights arises.57 
In deciding on the constitutionality of a statute 
or a rule, the courts will balance the Interests 
of the parties involved. With regard to the 
school curriculum, students, parents, teachers, 
and the state will have interests which must be 
taken into consideration.58 
When this occurs, "curricular elements, be they whole 
courses or single words, must be analyzed legally."59 
In the process of developing curriculum and selecting 
instructional materials, the question of censorship 
Inevitably arises. Instructional materials are selected 
with an eye toward devising learning experiences which will 
accomplish the goals of the curriculum. Of significance in 
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this area, and a factor which has contributed to Increased 
challenge, is that while 
.American schools of an earlier day were 
characterized by a paucity of materials, the 
schools of today have available a wide assortment 
of supplies which may be used in classroom 
instruction.60 
This includes charts, maps, video cassettes, films, film 
strips, models, scientific equipment, workbooks, and most 
recently, computer hardware with its accompanying software, 
in addition to textbooks. 
When the courts of the various states have been 
faced with Issues pertaining to instructional 
materials in the public schools, the courts have 
recognized the power of the state to control 
instructional materials as an aspect of the basic 
control of a state over education unless the state 
constitution imposes certain limitations In this 
connect ion.61 
In a society as diverse as that of the United States, with 
the variety of materials available, attempts at censorship 
wi11 occur. 
Blacks Law Dictionary defines a censor as "one who 
examines publications, films, and the like for objectionable 
content."62 nThe i ike" would appear to pertain to 
curricular issues. As Reutter points out, "Operationally, 
most issues of censorship arise when a significant segment 
of the public objects to something actually being done or 
proposed."63 In the area of religion and the public school 
curriculum, the trend is a move to challenge materials that 
conflict with Christian theology. And as McCarthy points 
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out, "With the multiple actors and Interests involved in 
censorship disputes, the issues do not lend themselves to 
simplistic resolutions."64 
Edward Jenkinson, a scholar in the area of censorship, 
lists several reasons for the occurrence of censorship. 
These reasons include the removal of prayer from schools; 
the charge of teaching secular humanism; innovative 
programs, including values clarification and sex education; 
a fear and distrust of modern literature and contemporary 
authors because they frequently address non-traditional 
themes; the perceived lack of communication between schools 
and the communities they serve; the feminist movement; the 
emergence of ethnic literature; and simply the inability to 
understand what is going on in the schools.65 
The Constitution itself provides some censorship of 
currlcular elements. "Nevertheless, on the whole, the 
Constitution is a document that restrains censors, 
particularly through the application of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments."66 
Some censorship occurs when boards and legislatures 
deliberately do not place certain items in the curriculum.67 
Whenever and however censorship or attempted censorship 
occurs, it is a negative and emotionally laden term. "In 
liberal circles, it is also a pejorative term."68 
Regardless, when censorship occurs, and if it reaches 
adjudication, "The basic issue addressed is. . .whether. . . 
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a ban on particular books, materials, or teaching 
methodology involves a constitutional question."69 Those 
constitutional rights must be safe-guarded in a school 
setting the same as in any other setting. 
Parents as individuals have had limited success in 
chal1englng school boards. However, 
organized groups of parents have been influential 
In securing changes in board policies and in 
determining the outcomes of school board 
elections.70 
As they influence elections, they bring into power 
Individuals who represent their own views, beliefs, values, 
and opinions. Nevertheless, 
while courts have endorsed parents'" rights to be 
censors for their own children to some extent, the 
Judiciary has not been Inclined to allow the 
curriculum itself to be restricted to satisfy 
parents' religious preferences.71 
The current conflict between certain religious groups 
and the public schools must be resolved. 
If we are unable to arrive at a tentative accord 
regarding the place of religious Influences and 
religion Itself In the public school curriculum, a 
major purpose of education—the transmission of a 
broad spectrum of social and cultural values and 
the preservation of self-governing 
communities—also will be threatened.72 
The panel on religion, appointed by the Association 
for Supervision and Curriculum Development, makes several 
significant findings in its report. 
Not to establish religion is a requirement of our 
Constitution. Yet we cannot be truly free, in 
Jeffersonian terms, unless we are also educated. 
Teaching about religion is one element of the 
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public schools'"—and society's—crusade against 
" ignorance. ""73 [emphasis in original] 
It further notes that no law has ever specified 
"purification of public education from all secular 
influences."^ The Abi nqton decision made that clear. 
Even in the face of political attacks and enraged 
rhetoric, the fact remains that our schools are 
one of this country's strengths. But good schools 
can become better; appropriate attention to the 
varied roles of reHgions constitute one avenue to 
school Improvement.75 
In offering courses about religion, educators must be 
cognizant of their purpose. Is it to inculcate religious 
beliefs, or Is it truly to teach about the different 
influences religions have had on the development of the 
nation's culture and history?76 To offer courses about 
religion requires skillful Juggling on the part of public 
education. 
.the myriad variables in curriculum and 
instruction and the subject's inherent value for 
proselytization promise to make it a thorny 
thicket for school administrators and the courts 
alike.77 
Smith and Harnett specify five key areas in which 
caution will help to avoid challenge to study of the Bible 
as an academic offering. First is personnel, who should 
possess valid academic credentials In areas of comparative 
religion and related disciplines. Second Is the placement 
of the course within the curriculum. Third is careful 
selection of textbooks that emphasize historical, literary, 
or cultural themes rather than theological. Fourth is 
> » •  
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student choice with the option to enroll or not to enroll. 
Last Is evaluation to ensure that an academic approach with 
accompanying outcome is attained.78 
Lemon—V T  Kurtzman79, along with its companion case. 
statues which granted aid to parochial schools in two ways: 
first, by providing salary supplements; and second, by 
allowing parochial schools to purchase services, specific 
textbooks, and instructional materials. The two states 
involved were Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 
The regulations attendant to the statutes restricted 
and enjoined the use of the monies in several ways. The 
salary of a parochial school teacher could not be 
supplemented beyond that of a public school teacher; per 
pupil expenditures had to be less than those In a public 
school; certification comparable with state teacher 
certification standards was required of the private school 
teacher; and textbooks and instructional materials had to be 
secular in purpose. In spite of these regulations, 
appellees charged that the states did not have a right to be 
involved in the business of sectarian education. 
Noting that, "The language of the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment is at best opaque. . .,"80 
questioned the constitutionality of state 
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the Court devised a three part test to determine the 
constitutionality of the statutes. It relied on tests 
established In previous cases. 
In the absence of precisely stated constitutional 
prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to 
the three main evils against which the 
Establishment Clause was intended to afford 
protection. . . . 
Every analysis in this area must begin with 
consideration of the cumulative criteria developed 
by the Court over many years. Three such tests 
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute 
must have a secular purpose; second its principal 
or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion. Board of Education 
v. Allen. 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the 
statute must not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement with religion." Walz. supra at 674.81 
Thus evolved a three-part test that could be applied in 
subsequent litigation in which an alleged violation of first 
amendment rights had occurred. Specifically, these three 
questions constitute the Lemon test: 
Does the statute have a secular purpose? 
Does the principle of the statute either advance or 
inhibit religion? 
Does it require or foster excessive entanglement?82 
While the Supreme Court cited Board of Education v. 
A1 len and Wal z in establishing the tripartite test, 
historical precedent can be found in earlier cases. In the 
landmark decision, Everson v. Board of Education83, the 
Court ruled constitutional a New Jersey statute which 
authorized transportation cost payments to parents of school 
children enrolled in non-profit private and parochial 
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schools. The Court addressed the Issue of purpose and 
effect in reaching that conclusion. 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the 
First Amendment means at least this: Neither a 
state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one 
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another. . . .84 
The Court further went on to say: 
The test may be stated as follows: What are the 
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? 
If either is the advancement or inhibition of 
religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of 
legislative power as circumscribed by the 
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand 
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there 
must be a secular legislative purpose and a 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
rellgion.85 
A second landmark decision, the school prayer case of 
School Dist. of Ablngton Township, v. Schempp86. reiterated 
these same two tests, as it cited the preceding quotation. 
The third case establishing the first two prongs of the 
test (and actually cited in Lemon> was Board of Education v. 
Allan87. The facts in this case concerned a challenge to a 
New York state law which required the state to furnish 
textbooks free of charge to students enrolled in private, as 
well as public, schools. Citing Everson. the Court 
concluded that the law was not unconstitutional. 
This test [Everson] Is not easy to apply, but the 
citation of Everson by the Schempp Court to 
support its general standard made clear how the 
Schempp rule would be applied to facts of Everson. 
The statute upheld in Everson would be considered 
a law having a "secular legislative purpose and a 
primary effect that neither advances nor Inhibits 
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religion." We reach the same result with respect 
to the New York law. . .Appellants have shown us 
nothing about the necessary effects of the statute 
that is contrary to its stated [secular] 
purpose.88 
The final prong in the Lemon test was established in 
Walz v. Tax Commission89. A real estate owner challenged 
the constitutionality of a New York City law which provided 
tax exempt status to non-profit religious, charitable, or 
educational institutions. In making a determination that 
the law was not unconstitutional, the Court addressed the 
purpose and effect questions, but was not content to stop 
there. 
Determining that the legislative purpose of tax 
exemption Is not aimed at establishing, 
sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end 
the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that 
the end result—the effect—Is not excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion.90 
Even so, this same Court recognized the difficulty in 
consistently applying its intent. 
[I3t is far easier to agree on the purpose that 
underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clause than to obtain agreement on 
the standards that should govern their 
applicat ion.9* 
What does the application of each of these tests 
involve? The secular purpose test is designed to measure 
the Intent of the political agency which formulates and 
adopts a particular statute, policy, or regulation. A mere 
statement of secular purpose is insufficient. 
If a secular purpose for its statute is 
articulated by a legislature, that articulation. 
• !• 
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alone, is not conclusive. It will not prevent the 
law's Invalidation on establishment grounds if the 
state secular purpose is either not credible or if 
it is insubstantial when compared to a preeminent 
re 1igious purpose.92 
In viewing the second prong, the Court has tended to be 
heavily swayed by the "context of coercion such as that 
created by compulsory schooling laws which forcibly assemble 
highly impressionable school children."93 In several of the 
cases analyzed later in the paper, there are instances when 
compulsory attendance was a factor. 
The test of excessive entanglement is designed to 
determine the degree of involvement of the state in the 
monitoring, supervision, and administration of a statute to 
ensure that It does not establish, promote, or Inhibit 
religion. This entanglement may be two fold—the 
administrative function of government, and the prospect for 
political dlvlslveness. 
The point of the administrative entanglement 
category is to prevent continuing overlap of the 
affairs of church and state. . . . 
The goal of the political dlvlslveness category is 
to prevent political devlslveness over religious 
issues.94 
Of the three questions at issue, the excessive entanglement 
test has not been as extensively applied as the others. 
The Judiciary has relied heavily on the Lemon test 
since its inception in 1971, and while some prongs have been 
interpreted as more germane to a particular point in 
question than others, the value of the test seems secure. 
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The Supreme Court expressed its importance in determining 
religious issues. "When the Court has been called upon to 
construe the breadth of the Establishment Clause, it has 
examined the criteria developed over a period of time."95 
Lemon v. Kurtzman. . .identified standards that 
have proven useful in analyzing case after case 
both in our decisions and in those of other 
courts. It is the only coherent test a majority 
of the Court has ever adopted.96 
PRAYER/MOMENTS OF SILENCE 
Prayer in public schools has been a matter of course 
from the time schools were established, and it has been 
targeted as the cause of frequent controversy, ultimately 
resolved in the courts. At some point in time at least half 
of the states have directed that public schools provide an 
opportunity for prayer and/or Bible reading. "Prior to 
1962, at least twelve states and the District of Columbus 
required Bible reading."97 
The fact that many schools in the Colonial era used the 
Bible as the predominent source of instruction inculcated 
religious practices into the school curriculum. As more 
instructional materials become available, the Bible became 
less Important, but the established tradition remained 
evident in classrooms.98 Even in states where such 
activities were banned, school officials tended to overlook 
this fact and continued to condone prayer and Bible reading. 
The resulting litigation found state court rulings upholding 
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such activities, as well as striking them down. In their 
book. Courts and the Law. Fulbrlght and Bolmeier provide a 
history of early cases dealing with school prayer and Bible 
reading.99 
The Maine Supreme Court held that a specific version of 
the Bible could be required for a school classroom.100 in 
1856 a Massachusetts court ruled that students could be 
compelled to bow their heads during prayer.101 A 
mid-western court refused to enjoin religious activities in 
the schools because, it said, the exercises did not turn the 
school into a church. However it did note that students 
could not be compelled to participate.102 An Ohio court 
ruled that a school board could require Bible reading.103 
Several cases held that when activities were conducted 
without comment and when participation was voluntary, there 
was no constitutional violation of the first amendment.10"* 
A Georgia court ruled that a school could not provide an 
opportunity for daily Bible reading even though a city 
ordinance called for it.105 
Several courts ruled against prayer and Bible reading 
in the schools. A Nebraska court ruled that reading from 
the King James Bible, prayers, and hymns were forbidden by 
state constitution. The court made note of the admissions 
of the teachers that the activities were religious in 
intention.106 A Louisiana court struck down similar 
activity, even though students could be excused, because it 
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violated the constitutional rights, in particular, those of 
the Jewish faith.107 In 1981, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned an Arizona school 
board policy that allowed student council members to open 
voluntary assemblies with a prayer.108 When the United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. the ruling stood. 
The same was true of a Louisiana case when the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled against a state statute authorizing 
voluntary school prayer.109 
It was the year 1962, however, that brought the 
landmark decision which was to eliminate prayer from public 
schools in the United States.110 It was followed a year 
later by two companion cases which found prayer and Bible 
reading in violation of the first amendment, even though 
both were voluntary, and defendants claimed the Bible was 
non-denominational .i11 
Enael was the flxst school prayer case to be heard by 
the Supreme Court. It involved the New York Regents 
Prayer1i2 which the New York Board of Regents had developed 
with the recommendation that the prayer be adopted for an 
opening school activity, with students reciting the prayer 
in unison before a teacher. Parents of ten students 
challenged the constitutionality of the activity, charging 
that it violated the first amendment. The Supreme Court 
noted: 
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Neither the fact that the prayer may be 
denominationally neutral nor the fact that its 
observance on the part of the students is 
voluntary can serve to free it from the 
limitations of the Establlshment 
Clause. . .113 
Before It reviewed the history of this country's 
religious heritage, the Court spoke strongly about the place 
of government in religion. 
We agree with the contention [petitioners''] that 
the constitutional prohibition against laws 
respecting an establishment of religion must at 
least mean that in this country it is no part of 
the business of government to compose official 
prayers for any group of the American people to 
recite as a part of a religious program carried on 
by government.114 
The United States Supreme Court strengthened its 
position against government-sponsored religious activity in 
the schools when it ruled In School District of Ablngton 
Townsh1 P v. Schempp. and Its companion case, Murray v. 
Cur 1ett. The challenged exercise In Schempp included the 
daily reading of ten Bible verses, followed by the 
recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Participation was 
voluntary and students could leave the room. The activities 
in Murray were similar. As in Enael. the Court concluded 
that the activities were unconstitutional. It warned: 
The breach of neutrality that is today a trlckly 
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent, 
and in the words of Madison, "it is proper to take 
alarm at the first experiment on our 
1 ibert les." 
In so ruling, however, the Court did not preclude the 
study of the Bible. 
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Nothing we have said here indicates that such 
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented 
objectively as part of a secular program of 
education, may not be effected consistently with 
the First Amendment.1 
In finding the activities unconstitutional. Justice Clark 
stated it eloquently. 
The place of religion in our society is an exalted 
one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance 
on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel 
of the Individual heart and mind. We have come to 
recognize through bitter experience that it is not 
within the power of government to invade that 
citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid 
or oppose, to advance or retard. In the 
relationship between man and religion, the State 
is firmly committed to a position of 
neutrali ty.117 
Why did the Court choose to hear this case only one 
year after ruling in Enael. especially since the decision 
was in the affirmative, again with only one dissenting vote? 
Reutter suggests reasons for the Court's action. One was 
that "the case was decided by a full complement of 
Justices,"iiS as opposed to only seven Justices in the Engel 
case. Enael had been decided based on history and 
principle, with no citation of case lav/; therefore, in the 
eyes of many, it lacked sound legal and constitutional 
authority. 
Another reason for granting certiorari was that the 
case allowed several Justices to write concurring opinions 
"illuminating their personal views on the volatile subject 
of religious influence in governmental enterprises."^9 
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In Engel. there had been only one concurring 
opinion, that of Justice Douglas. . .In the 
present case, there were three concurring 
opinions, involving four Justices; thus, with the 
opinions of the Court and the one Justice dissent, 
only three Justices did not individually express 
themselves.120 
The results from these three cases made it clear that 
religious activities in the public schools were 
unconstitutional. These rulings from the 1960s, however, 
left some unanswered questions because the subject of 
litigation was expressed prayer and Bible reading. What 
about such areas as moments of silence? 
While generally it is accepted that moments of silence 
are permissible, those calling for meditation or prayer are 
suspect. 
As long as students are not instructed to pray, 
courts in general have accepted that the practice 
of starting the school day with a moment of silent 
reflection has a secular purpose in that It calms 
students.121 
However, there are several types of statutes that call 
for careful analysis of intent, such as required or 
voluntary prayer, and moments of silence and meditation. 
Litigation has continued because each issue must be decided 
on a case-by-case basis. In analyzing each case, the court 
will usually look at four areas: 
1) the Intent of the policy or statute, 2) the 
type of prayer encouraged or permitted, 3) the age 
of the probable participant, and 4) where and when 
the activity is to occur.122 (emphasis in 
original> 
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The court will also determine If the statute or activity 
meets the standards of Lemon. 
In making such a determination, the court applies the 
Lemon test that looks for indication of religious purpose. 
Three factors enter into play. 
The time the statute was enacted is critical. Prior to 
the early 1960s, no moments of silence existed. If statutes 
were enacted or proposed close to the Enael decision, they 
are suspect. The manner in which the statutes have been 
recorded Is a second indicator. The third indicator is the 
time of day during which the activity occurs.123 
The courts must analyze the secular purpose as well. 
They look at language as well as legislative history, and 
carefully weigh the arguments offered by the proponents of 
the legislation.124 
When the courts apply the effect test, they must look 
at the schools. What ocurred In the schools prior to 
enactment? They look at the role of the teacher who is an 
authority figure with the attendant power attributable to 
authority. And last are the students. What are the 
perceptions of the students with regards to the statute?125 
An entanglement violation review is usually not 
necessary because most statutes fail on either purpose 
or effect.126 Zerkel and Ager note that the 
lower courts during this decade have consistently 
in terms of overall outcome, rejected the 
constitutionality of various types of moments of 
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silence laws. Further, they have all adhered to 
the tripartite test, consistently finding 
violations of the secular purpose prong and to 
this extent they reached the other prongs finding 
them violated as well. . . .[T]hese courts have 
generally become increasingly non deferential in 
the formulation and application of this test to 
these state laws.127 
Differences in application have occured primarily as 
the result of attitudinal differences existing between the 
individual judges which may result from societal levels or 
the differences that exist from region to region.128 
The moment of silence cases reviewed in this study are 
attempts to put religion in the schools, and the cases have 
one thing in common. 
In one way or another, they seek to use America's 
compulsory schooling laws and public tax funds to 
advance religion by requiring its observance in 
the public school's program.-129 
The religious fervor sweeping the country is not likely to 
abate, and because of that fact, the debate continues from 
"the White House to the courthouse."!30 
In the first nine months of the 98th congress 
(January - September, 1983) a total of eighteen 
bills and resolutions were introduced in Congress 
relating to prayer, periods of silence, and "equal 
access."131 
The intent and purpose of this new legislation Is not much 
different from previously Introduced legislation. 
The attempt by President Reagan and several 
conservative religious groups to amend the Constitution in 
1983 and 1984 to allow school prayer is also indicative of 
this fervor. The United States Senate narrowly defeated 
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this legislative attempt, with proponents lacking only 
eleven votes to attain the required two thirds majority.132 
Its passage and ratification by the populace would have 
rendered McCol1 urn and Schempp null and void. 
The 1985 Supreme Court ruling in Wal lace v. Jaffree 
(which Is analyzed in greater depth in the following 
chapter) struck down an Alabama statute which allowed a 
moment of silent prayer in Alabama schools. This decision 
should deter future attempts by state legislatures and local 
school boards to implement statutes or policies condoning 
this type of activity which is in violation of the first 
amendment. 
AN OVERVIEW OF FUNDAMENTALISM 
An area of litigation which has become more prevalent 
within the past five years has revolved around the issues of 
balanced treatment and secular humanism, two areas which are 
primarily associated with the Protestant fundamentalist 
movement, a movement experiencing phenomenal growth in both 
numbers and power. James Davis, author of Dealing with 
Censorship states, "During the last few years significant 
growth has occurred among religious fundamentalists, 
estimated as high as forty million voters"133. This 
powerful movement, 
CWlell funded and dedicated to conservative 
political issues. . .is pro-family and pro-school 
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prayer. It is anti-evolution, anti-separation of 
church and state, and anti-humanistic.134 
The pressure to return the schools to an image of what some 
persons perceive them as having been appears to be coming 
primarily from "religious fundamentalists who have allied 
themselves with ultra-conservative politicians, the New 
Right."135 
What are the differences between the Protestant 
fundamentalist movement and the theological beliefs of other 
groups? 
"At its heart, the movement is cemented by two 
things: an unbudgeable belief in the word-for-word 
accuracy of the entire Bible and a spirit of 
militant resistance to anything in church or 
society that is thought to conflict with 
Scriptural commands.136 
However, one of the greatest differences Is the 
moral/philosophical focus on "truth". 
On one end of the continuum are those who believe 
that there are absolute moral truths, while on the 
other extreme are those who assert that truth is 
limited by experience and circumstances. These 
opposing positions are commonly labeled as moral 
absolutism and moral relativism.137 
The moral absolutist believes that humans are capable 
of finding a truth that does, in fact, exist In a rational 
and orderly world as revealed by an "Ultimate Intelligence 
who establishes the criterion for distinguishing truth from 
falsity."138 Thus, the goal of human existence is an 
on-going struggle to identify, and consequently uphold, that 
which is good. 
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The moral relativist believes that the situation and 
the context In which it occurs determine what morality is. 
There is not always a previous experience to dictate a right 
or wrong answer . 139 
The fundamentalist movement is nothing more or less 
than the individuals who comprise it, allowing it to 
accomplish many of its goals. At the national level think 
tanks develop policy which in turn Influences the elections 
for powerful political seats. Political action committees 
seek the election of people who are of a conservative bent. 
Groups at the middle echelon write "model" legislation which 
will allow the Inclusion of prayer in schools, and lobby for 
Instruction in creationism, textbook censorship, destruction 
of teacher unions, the advancement of Christian schools, 
lowering of public school taxes, the promotion of 
conservatism, and the elimination of secular humanism. 1 ^ 
For clarity's sake, and for an understanding of the 
fundamentalists*' place In recent litigation, a brief 
historical perspective of the evolution of the modern 
fundamentalist movement is a prerequisite. 
George Marsden describes the fundamentalist movement 
during the 1890s. 
Fundamentalism was a mosaic of divergent and 
sometimes contradictory traditions and tendencies 
that could never be totally integrated. Sometimes 
its advocates were backward looking and 
reactionary, at other times they were Imaginative 
innovators. On some occasions they appeared 
militant and divisive; on others they were warm 
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and irenic. At times they seemed ready to forsake 
the whole world over a point of doctrine; at other 
times they appeared heedless of tradition in their 
zeal to win converts. Sometimes they were 
prophets shaking from their feet the dust of a 
doomed civi1lzation.141 
While this ambivalent philosophy pervaded many of the 
fundamentalists'" ideas, a clearly defined tenet, however, 
was that souls must be saved. Anything else was subservient 
to this goal. 
Marsden attributes the term fundamentalism to a series 
of paperback volumes, published from 1910 to 1915, called 
The Fundamentals. These volumes were designed to be 
scholarly publications, authored by the leading "Bible 
teachers" of the time. Even though the publications did not 
elicit the hoped-for public response, they did have 
a long term effect of greater importance than its 
immediate impact or the lack thereof. It became a 
symbolic point of reference for identifying a 
"fundamentalist" movement. When in 1920 the term 
"fundamentalist" was coined, it called to mind the 
broad united front of the kind of opposition of 
modernism that characterized these widely known, 
if little studied, volumes. In retrospect, the 
volumes retain some usefulness In tracing the 
outlines of the emerging movement. They represent 
the movement at a moderate and transitional stage 
before it was reshaped and pushed to extremes by 
the Intense heat of controversy.142 
The articles defended the faith, and topics included 
Scripture, traditional theology, and testimony which tended 
to emphasize soul saving. Political causes were avoided. A 
critical issue was the "authority of God in scripture in 
relation to the authority of modern science." 
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Another tenet to which contributors to The Fundamentals 
adhered was absolute belief in the inerrancy of the Bible. 
James M. Gray, one of the contributors, said that by 
"''miraculous control-' the Bible was an absolute transcript 
of God's mind."144 
In 1919, a further narrowing of the intellectual 
parameters of the fundamentalist philosophy began. There 
were accusations that people were not following the 
religious principles of the faith.145 
The schools were becoming an issue as early as 1918 
when a publication appeared entitled Christian Fundamentals 
in School and Church. The King's Business, another 
fundamentalist publication, was concerned with the possible 
contamination of fundamental beliefs which might be occuring 
in public schools.146 
In 1920, fundamentalism stepped into the limelight when 
William Jennings Bryan represented the state of Arkansas in 
a highly publicized anti-evolution case.147. His emphasis 
on the superiority of faith over science attracted people to 
the cause. In fact, "not only did it [evolution] 'destroy 
the faith of Christians', it 'laid the foundation for the 
bloodiest war in history.'"148 
The fundamentalist philosophies were coalescing, and 
the emerging picture of the fundamentalist was beginning to 
assume a different look. Marsden quotes H. L. Mencken, as 
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he ridiculed the fundamentalists while reporting the Scopes 
trial for his newspaper: 
Fundamentalists are thick in the mean streets 
behind the gas-works. They are everywhere where 
learning is too heavy a burden for mortal minds to 
carry, even the vague, pathetic learning on tap In 
the little red school houses. They march with the 
Klan, with the Christian Endeavor Society, with 
the Junior Order of the United American Mechanics, 
with the Epworth League, with all the Rococo bands 
that poor and unhappy folk organize to bring some 
new light of purpose into their lives. They have 
had a thrill and they are ready for more.149 
Following the debacle of the confrontation between 
Bryan and Darrow, the vitality of the fundamentalist 
movement waned. Opposing factions formed and it appeared 
their interest lay more in fighting with each other than in 
conquering the world for Christ.150 
Two changes had occurred. Fundamentalism now came to 
be associated with small-town, rural Protestant America, 
opposed to anything modern. In addition, it was viewed as 
anti-intellectual, and not worth the respect of the more 
urban, intellectual society.l5i 
Yet, fundamentalism was built of sterner stuff. In 
spite of it all, the 1930s saw the fundamentalist movement 
fight successfully to survive. It appeared to thrive In the 
South, with the Southern Baptist Convention gaining a 
million and a half new members, and less moderate groups 
such as Holiness and Pentecostal, gaining adherents.152 
During the 1930's the fundamentalists weathered 
defeat and ridicule by shifting their energies to 
evangelism and religious community-building. 
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Fundamentalism had the popular support, structural 
strength. Innovative flexibility, and reproductive 
potential to maintain its vitality during the 
Depression years and by the 1940's to seek once 
again to win America—this time by revival. And 
although it used discredited Intellectual 
equipment, the fundamentalist movement produced a 
message that attracted many at a time when 
Americans were searching for a heritage to play a 
leading role in the postwar evangelical 
revival.153 
With their value system intact, and a hard-fast belief 
that they were responsible for their neighbor, the 
fundamentalists came through the '30s and '40s. Much of the 
formal church framework no longer had appeal to those 
outside the congregation, so radio assumed a new importance, 
and this medium provided, "potent aid to fundamentalist 
outreach and institutional growth."154 
Following World War II, a further outburst of religious 
fervor occurred. Church attendance was up. However: 
At the same time, family disruptions and the 
enticements of wide-open industrial and 
military-base boom towns brought disturbing 
reports of public licentiousness and teen-age 
crime.155 
The cry arose to help American youth, and the public 
responded. Church groups, youth groups such as Youth for 
Christ International, and radio preachers worked to provide 
the opportunity for salvation to the misguided. In one 
group alone, an outgrowth of the Youth for Christ, rallies 
went from 300 to 900 In Its first year. These efforts 
served to swell the ranks of the growing evangelical 
movement.156 
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Societal change may help account for the resurgence of 
the fundamental 1st movement between the year 1945 (the end 
of World War II> and the present. The traditional values of 
the fundamentalist group could not be accommodated to the 
new, modern, pluralistic society. Therefore, the 
fundamentalist movement had to be strong to survive.157 
Martin Marty has written several books and articles on 
the subject of fundamentalism. He maintains that it is a 
social phenomenon, and he offers several reasons why it has 
come to be so vlsable and, frequently, belligerent. 
First, fundamentalism is a reaction to what the 
fundamentalist perceives as the mixed blessings of the 
modern age. "It is clearly a force of resentment against 
intellectuals, elites, the media, and the like, people who 
are at home with modernization and care little for presumed 
traditions."1^ 
Second, fundamentalism appears to have resemblance to a 
form of tribalism as exemplified In many of the African 
nations. The Fundamentalists are establishing "their own 
place, power, pride, and Identity."159 
Third, the movement is an attempt to fill a niche. The 
so-called "values crisis" in America has allowed the 
fundamentalist to step forward and offer his absolute to a 
nation that sees ambiguity. He can tout his good against a 
perceived evil.160 
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Last, fundamentalists possess a willingness to use the 
products of modern technology even if they frequently decry 
Its effects as used by others. They are skillful users of 
radio, TV, computers, and direct mail.161 
What provides the bulwark for the fundmental1st 
movement today? Many scholars attribute its primary 
strength and power to the South where World War II was 
followed by an explosive expansion in the Sunbelt. This 
resulted in a new wealth built on oil, cattle, land 
development, tourism, retailing, electronics, and 
aerospace.162 
The movement itself has a cast of thousands. 
Individual members of the movement may be found in small, 
medium, and large fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and 
Evangelical congregations of all denominations. Many are 
highly literate, well-educated people who speak well for the 
cause.163 There are televangelists who reach into millions 
of homes through command of vast communications networks 
supported by millions of dollars.16^ it includes 
influential political figures.16^ it is small town America 
and large city America, rural to urban, and Its powerful, 
charismatic leaders are found in all professions—clergy, 
politicians, college professors, lawyers, and doctors. 
One must always remember, however, that these people 
are only the visible spearheads of a following that numbers 
in the millions, each of whom believes firmly and solidly in 
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the righteousness of his cause. When the fundamentalist has 
a grievance, the Judicial system is seen as a potential 
source for favorable response to his prayers. These are the 
individuals who are bringing suit against school systems. 
BALANCED TREATMENT 
One such area for conflict is that which exists between 
creation ism and evolution. This has been a focus of concern 
for several years because, 
those who rigidly adhere to the strict 
constructionist Biblical account of creation 
maintain particular umbrage toward school systems 
which teach science from an evolutionary 
premise.166 
In fact, proponents of creation science maintain that 
instruction in evolution supports the establishment of 
another religion, that of secular humanism. 
The 1927 Scopes trial, commonly referred to as the 
"Monkey Trial," brought national and international attention 
to the battle between advocates of the two theories. The 
trial pitted two legal giants against one another, and while 
William Jennings Bryan, representing the state, won a 
technical victory, the defense, represented by Clarence 
Darrow, "won a popular victory in his devastating 
cross-examination of Bryan."167 However, not all writers 
interpret the outcome of the Scopes trial in the same 
manner. 
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Spurred on by its Scopes victories, 
fundamental ism''s anti-evolutionary school program 
prevailed during the 1920s to early In the 1960s. 
It had a subtle but pervasive influence on biology 
in all public schools, primarily by affecting 
textbook selection and hence, the content of what 
publishers were willing to publish in their 
textbooks.168 
When the Russian Sputnik in 1957 ended all of this, 
America's turn to science was almost Immediately 
met by a resurgence of Fundamentalism in the early 
1960s, spurred on by the additional fear of a 
growing secularism in American society.169 
What is creationism? Basically, it consists of three 
elements, each outlined in the first two chapters of the 
book of Genesis: 
1) that the earth and universe are relatively 
young, perhaps only 6,000 to 10,000 years old; 
2> that the present physical form of earth is 
explained by "catastrophism" including a 
world-wide flood; and 
3) that all living things (including humans) were 
created miraculously, essentially in their present 
forms.170 
Many groups have spoken out against creationism as a 
science, pointing out, primarily, that it cannot withstand 
the tests of science because it "has no foundation in 
evidence, experimentation, or observation."171 Rather, it 
"is based on belief and revelation and cannot change 
regardless of evidence to the contrary."172 
The terms "'creation science-' and 'scientific 
creationism' were adopted by fundamentalist religious groups 
as descriptions" of their theory of creation.173 This 
followed the changes in the science curriculum when it 
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appeared evident that evolution would be an integral part of 
the program. 
In 1968 the Supreme Court handed down its landmark 
decision when it ruled that an Arkansas statute forbidding 
the teaching of evolution was unconstitutional. 174 "jhe 
initial controversy between proponents of evolution and 
those of creation science centered around teaching evolution 
at all. In Epperson. the Court upheld the right of the 
school officials to develop curriculum, while making it 
clear that this right could not proscrlpt constitutional 
rights. 
By and large, public education in our Nation is 
committed to the control of state and local 
authorities. Courts do not and cannot Intervene 
in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the 
daily operation of school systems and which do not 
directly and sharply implicate basic 
constitutional values. On the the other hand, 
"the vigilant protection of constitutional freedom 
is nowhere more vested than in the community of 
American schools."175 
Because the statute required an endorsement and sanction of 
a particular religious belief, it was found 
unconstitutional. 
The Court found the law violated the First 
Amendment because it proscribed a respected 
scientific theory from the classroom for no other 
reason but that it was in conflict with a 
particular religious doctrine in the book of 
Genesis.i76 
The Epperson decision represented a blow to the 
anti-evolutionary groups because they could no longer rely 
on legislative dicta disallowing the teaching of evolution. 
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Having failed to eliminate It [evolution] from the 
curriculum, many opponents of the theory of 
evolution have zeroed in on books which allegedly 
do not respect religious neutrality, that is, 
books that do not give equal space to competing 
views of the creation of man.177 
They now looked at the public school curriculum, 
querying whether creatlonlsm could be taught under the 
rubric of academic freedom. In other words, if Instruction 
in evolution couldn't be prohibited, could instruction in 
creatlonlsm be added? "Several Fundamentalist groups 
emerged whose purpose was to promote creationism."178 The 
results of such attempts were legislative attempts to 
introduce balanced treatment statutes. 
Daniel v. Waters179 ruled a 1973 Tennesse statute 
unconstitutional. The statute prohibited instruction that 
stated evolution was a fact, and also required a balanced 
treatment of creatlonlsm If evolution was presented. 
A similar case occurred in Texas in 1972.180 
Plaintiffs alleged a violation of their constitutional right 
to freedom of religion because evolution was Included in the 
biology curriculum. The Judge ruled that such an inclusion 
did not inhibit their religious freedom, nor was it a 
sanction of secularism. 
Such defeats, however, did not deter legislators from 
trying to implement balanced treatment statutes. "Indeed 
during 1980-81, 'equal time' provisions were introduced in 
15 states, and two of those were enacted into law."181 
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Proponents of teaching "creation science" in the 
public schools convinced at least two 
legislatures, those of Arkansas and Louisiana, 
[McLean. Aqui 1 lard] and the State Board of Texas 
[textbook adoption procedures] that the account of 
creation in the Bible was as scientific as 
Darwin's theory and it was, therefore, a 
legitimate scientific theory.182 
A federal district court struck down the Alabama 
Statute as unconstitutional, as did the Supreme Court in 
the Louisiana case. It would appear that the precedent set 
by the latter decision will eliminate future attempts to 
provide balanced treatment. What new directions the 
fundamentalists will pursue remain to be seen. 
SECULAR HUMANISM 
The adherents for religion in the schools frequently 
base their arguments on the premise that public schools are 
advancing a religion called "secular humanism" to the 
exclusion of thelstlc religions. Areas and topics in the 
curriculum that are particularly vulnerable to such 
challenge are values clarification, sex education, 
evolution, death education, global ism, Journal entries, 
situation ethics, and any topic pertaining to self-analysis. 
The antl-human 1st points to The Humanist Manifesto I and II. 
and A Secular Humanist Declaration, as he emphasizes that 
John Dewey, the father of modern education, signed Manlfesto 
1, and that other prominent educators have signed subsequent 
documents. The threat these individuals perceive in these 
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documents, especially The Humanist Manifesto I. is Inherent 
in the following: 
It reflected all of the influences of science, 
evolution and the new psychology which were 
reshaping American education. It called for the 
abandonment of traditional religion and replaced 
It with a new secular religion better able to 
accommodate the new moral relativism inherent in a 
man-centered, godless world. 
Secular humanism is an emotional Issue at best, that 
has elicited critical response from both sides. 
Some humanists have asserted that the absolutist 
morality championed by conservative evangelicals 
poses a threat to reason, democracy, and freedom. 
On the other hand, some fundamentalists have 
referred to humanism as "Satan's philosophy," 
which promises ultimate doom unless it is 
completely eradicated.184 
The major controversy appears to stem from lack of a 
clear definition of secular humanism which can be agreed 
upon by all parties concerned. The fundamentalist has one 
definition of secular humanism, while the humanist has 
another. Many of the fundamentalist organizations offer the 
following explanation of secular humanism. 
Humanism is faith in man Instead of faith in God. 
Humanism was officially ruled a religion by the U. 
S. Supreme Court. Humanism promotes: 1) situation 
ethics, 2) evolution, 3) sexual freedom. Including 
public sex education courses, and 4) 
International ism. 
Humanism centers on "self" because It recognizes 
no higher thing to which man is responsible. . . 
This eliminates coming to Christ for forgiveness 
of sin. It eliminates the Christian attributes of 
meekness and humility. Where does self-esteem end 
and arrogance begin? 
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Such terms as se1f-concept, self-esteem, 
self-awareness, se1f-acceptance, self-fulfillment, 
self-realization, body-awareness, etc., are 
frequently used. All leave the students occupied 
primarily with themselves and this is wrong. 
There are others to consider. Self-centered 
persons are seldom an asset to themselves, to 
their friends, family, or country.185 
Fundamentalists view the secular humanist as; 
Anti-God. The secular humanist wants to tear God 
down from His throne and make Man the sovereign of 
the universe. 
Anti-democracy. The secular humanist hopes to do 
away with present governments and make the world 
one huge, totalitarian state. 
Anti-family. The secular humanist undermines the 
family concept, denies Christian values that are 
taught in the home, and preaches to the youth of 
America that there are no absolute morals. 
Anti-Christian. The secular humanist preaches the 
religion of Secular Humanism through textbooks and 
by means of the following teaching techniques: 
values clarification, moral education, human 
development, family life and human relations, 
affective education, and psychological learning, 
to name a few.186 
These appear to be the readily accepted philosophical 
underpinnings advanced by such groups as Jerry Fa1well's 
Moral Majority, and Phyllis Schlafiys Eagle Forum. On the 
other hand, there are equally as many definitions and 
directions from the humanists. In his scholarly tome. 
Salvation and the Perfect Society, the Eternal Quest. Alfred 
Braunthal devotes a chapter entirely to secular humanism. 
The ultimate goal of secular humanism—the 
perfection of society through human 
efforts—presupposes not the gratuitous grace of 
God, but rather the full responsibility of man for 
his own thoughts and deeds.1®7 
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Paul Kurtz, another world recognized humanist, was one 
of the experts who played such a prominent role in Smith v. 
Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, as Judge 
Hand proclaimed that secular humanism was a religion which 
the public schools of Alabama were unconstitutionally 
advancing. 
Humanism as a philosophy is opposed to all forms 
of mythological illusions (religious or 
ideological) about man and his place in the 
universe. . .Any thelstic Interpretation of the 
universe and any eschatologlcal drama about divine 
beginnings and ends is rejected because it is 
logically meaningless and empirically 
unverified.188 
Kurtz further stresses that man is a free agent capable of 
guiding and creating his own destiny, and because he 
possesses this capability, he is worthy of respect and 
dignity. 189 
Continuing in the same vein, H. L. Blackham expands on 
the philosophy of humanism. "I deprecate any definition of 
Humanism that mutilates it with an epithet—ethical, 
scientific, religious. Humanism, then. Is a concept of 
man."190 He further promotes the concept that humanism is 
historical rather than metaphysical. 
There is a sensitive regard for each man as his 
own end and for man as responsible for man. This 
notion of human responsibility is the nuclear idea 
in the definition of Humanism.191 
He insists that humanism is based on a program for humanity, 
and the program calls for 
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international security, aid, conservation, 
population control, development and direction of 
technology, education for autonomy and an open 
society. . . 
Here is humanism with a reasonable faith in 
intelligent action.192 
Similar concepts have been expressed by Linus Pauling, 
the Nobel laureate, who defined humanism as a "philosophy of 
Joyous service for the greater good of all humanity, of 
application of new ideas, of scientific progress, for the 
benefit of all mankind."193 
Echoing these same sentiments, the National Council of 
Teachers of English said, "Humanism offers the reasoned view 
that human beings alone shape their destinies, leaving to 
scientific inquiry the probing of nature's unknown."194 
The fundamentalist has come to perceive secular 
humanism as a "residual category encompassing everything 
taught in public education that does not reinforce Christian 
beliefs."19^ if beliefs/values are taught from a 
non-religious perspective, that is a violation of the first 
amendment; if taught from a theistic perspective, that too 
is an abridgement of constitutionally protected rights. In 
either case, the schools are caught in the "crossfire."196 
The fundamentalist claims that by teaching material such as 
values clarification, sex education, and the like, the 
schools are unconstitutionally establishing a religion of 
secular humanism.197 
77 
Samuel Blumenfeld, In his book about the National 
Education Association, discusses the pervasive humanist 
curriculum. 
Easily the most Important of the NEA's strategies 
Is that concerning the contents of education, for 
the socialist revolution wanted by the 
progressives will have to be carried out by a 
younger generation indoctrinated in progressive, 
humanist values.198 
The problem arises over the question of whether secular 
humanism is, indeed, a religion whose advancement by a 
public agency, namely the schools, is an unconstitutional 
violation of the first amendment. And it would appear the 
question of the religious nature of secular humanism is a 
serious one. A People for the American Way study noted that 
more than one-fourth (26.3) percent of the 
Incidents reported to the study were sparked by 
allegations that Instructional materials or course 
content contained elements of "secular 
humanism."199 
The problem with this type of challenge is that either 
eliminating "secular humanism" or including Christian tenets 
would not provide a solution. However, as Gail Sorenson 
notes in the commentary, "Religion and the Public School 
Curriculum," "If secular humanism were considered a 
religion, and if it were taught as dogma rather than as 
social fact, this type of challenge could prove 
successfu1."200 
In essence, if secular humanistic instruction were 
barred from public schools under the establishment 
clause, certain instruction tailored to Christian 
tenets would suffer the same fate.201 
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Few cases have been filed In which secular humanism per 
se is an issue. Until 1983, in those cases which have 
reached the bench, "courts usually have discussed the 
specific allegation but have not elaborated on what 
constitutes secular humanism. . ."202 These cases include 
Wright v. Houston Ind. School Plst ,203 Crowlev v. 
Smithsonian Institute204 <a non-school case). Smith v. 
Rlccl .205 ancj Williams v. Board of Educ. of the County of 
When cases in which secular humanism is an Issue are 
argued, attorneys rely heavily on Torcaso v. Watklns207. in 
this case, a man challenged the Office of Notary Public of 
Maryland when he was denied a notary public commission. He 
refused to abide by the rules of the commission because he 
would not swear to a belief in God, and subsequently sued. 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Torcaso, reiterating its 
position that a government cannot pass laws which pose 
religious requirements. Included in that decision is 
footnote eleven: 
Among religions in this country which do not teach 
what would generally be considered a belief in the 
existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical 
Cultures, Secular Humanism and others.208 
Proponents of the theory that secular humanism is a religion 
rely on this Supreme Court decision footnote. 
A second decision is the Abinqton decision when the 
Supreme Court ruled that 
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the state may not establish a "religion of 
secularism" in the sense of affirmatively opposing 
or showing hostility to religion, thus preferring 
those who believe in no religion over those who do 
not believe.209 
A more recent reference can be found in Fink v. Board 
of Educ. of the Warren County School Dlst.210 The court 
indicated secular humanism may be a religion, but did not 
specifically state what would make it subject to first 
amendment prohibition.211 
Two recent cases have suggested a change in 
Mofri le County and Mozert yt Hawkins County Publ iC 
Schools212. the federal district court interpreted secular 
humanism as a religion. When Judge Brevard Hand ruled that 
secular humanism was a religion, "It was the first time a 
federal Judge has ruled secular humanism a religion."2*3 
That the decision could create problems for public schools 
is evident. 
At the core of this case is the assumption that 
the doctrines of humanism, as expressed in the 
Humanist Manifestos are automatically advanced to 
the exclusion of theistic doctrines in public 
educat ion,214 
The district court decision was overturned by the Court of 
Appeals for the 11th Circuit. Upon appeal the United States 
Supreme Court denied certlorarl. The second problematic 
case is Mosert Va Hawkins County Public Schools in which 
parents challenged the use of the Holt basal reading series. 
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alleging that the textbooks violated their constitutional 
rights because they advanced a humanistic education. 
While not specifically raised as an issue in this 
case, religious objections to a humanistic 
education seem to be couched in the' argument that 
humanistic values, of which some are non sectarian 
in nature, are being taught as a religion of 
secular human ism.215 
The inference is that when one is taught values 
contradictory to the values taught in the home, the school 
Is advancing secular humanism as a religion, and 
consequently violating the children's and parents*' religious 
rights. Judge Hull ruled In favor of the plaintiffs and 
offered the parents an excusal option. While he did not so 
state specifically, the decision implied that secular 
humanism could be interpreted to be religion. This 
decision, like the Smlth decision was overturned by the 
Court of Appeals for the 6th District, and certiorari was 
denied by the Supreme Court. 
It is probably safe to assume that individuals will 
continue to seek ways to challenge perceived religious 
secular humanism in the public schools. The wording of the 
complaints will differ, and specific curricular areas may 
change, but there remains a sincere belief on the part of 
many religious groups that secular humanism is a very real 
threat to their beliefs. Therefore, until the Supreme Court 
grants certiorari In a secular humanism case and chooses to 
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define what constitutes a religion, secular humanism will 
remain an issue of great magnitude and complexity. 
If the Supreme Court eventually should rule that 
it is a religious belief and that public schools 
are unconstitutionally advancing this 
dogma. . .the implications would be staggering. 
Practically all facets of the public school 
curriculum would seem vulnerable to First 
Amendment challenge.216 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYSIS OF CASES 
INTRODUCTION 
The Lemon tripartite test has been employed In a 
significant number of cases in order to determine the 
constitutionality of certain activities occurring within the 
public schools. These activities allegedly violate the 
establishment clause of the first amendment, which is 
applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment. 
Litigation has focused on moments-of-si1ence statutes, 
religious clubs meeting on school grounds during the school 
day, statutes mandating balanced treatment of evolution and 
creation science, mandated curricula such as sex education 
and Bible classes, charges that content contained in state 
adopted textbooks advances secular humanism <a philosophy 
believed by many to constitute a religion), and compensatory 
education. This chapter examines 17 recent cases in which 
the courts utilized the Lemon test in ruling whether the 
activity violated the first amendment. The decisions will 
be analyzed by content area—prayer/moments of silence 
statutes, balanced treatment statutes, secular humanism, sex 
education and compensatory education. 
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PRAYER/MOMENTS OF SILENCE 
Prayer In public schools has been an issue for many 
years. Recent litigation has centered around two areas. 
The first area concerns clubs in which religious activities 
provide the focus and reason for a meeting. Such activities 
may Include teacher and student directed prayer, 
testimonials, religious speakers, and distribution of 
religious materials. An adjunct to these meetings is the 
attendant use of school public address systems and bulletin 
boards. 
The second area concerns moments of silence. Moments 
of silence are legislative statutes and school district 
actions that permit school districts to implement procedures 
which afford students the opportunity to engage in some form 
of quiet contemplation that may include a moment or minute 
of silence, meditation, prayer or any combination of the 
preceding. The wording of the statutes and school district 
policies may vary from district to district and state to 
state. Individuals opposed to prayer in school frequently 
view such legislation as a covert, and sometimes overt, 
attempt to allow prayer in the public schools, and seek 
legal redress, claiming the acts are an establishment or 
endorsement of religion. Advocates of prayer in the schools 
defend such acts and attempt to keep them on the books 
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because they do allow students to engage In some type of 
prayer activity. 
This section examines ten cases which have been 
litigated because of some type of prayer activity in the 
public schools. 
A case that helped establish precedent in the arena of 
moments of silence statutes was filed in Louisiana in 
1981.1 Parents challenged the constitutionality of a 
Louisiana statute2 which was written in two sections. 
Section A permitted a moment of silent meditation at the 
beginning of each school day. Section B authorized local 
school boards to permit a teacher to lead a prayer if no 
student volunteered to do so. The plaintiffs challenged the 
implementation of Section B which the Jefferson Parish 
School Board had authorized. 
These guidelines provide that each school day will 
begin at the regular time with a minute of prayer 
followed by a minute-of silent meditation.3 
Students who did not wish to participate In the prayer were 
excused. Those who wished to participate had to have 
written parental permission. 
The district court had ruled that neither section B nor 
Jefferson Parish's guidelines for imp 1 emeu ting It were in 
violation of the establishment clause. In so doing, the 
district court had accepted the testimony of the primary 
authors of the statute and the school board official who had 
sponsored the local implementation resolution. 
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The witnesses stated that the purpose of the 
school prayer program was to increase religious 
tolerance by exposing school children to beliefs 
different from their own and to develop in 
students a greater esteem for themselves and 
others by enhancing their awareness of the 
spiritual dimensions of human nature.4 
Aware that the plaintiffs would appeal its decision, the 
district court issued an injunction to halt Implementation 
until the appellate court had heard the case. 
In reviewing the district court decision, the appellate 
court disagreed that the testimony proved that the statute 
was not religious. The latter court cited the three 
elements of the Lemon test as the criteria to be used 
preparatory to reaching any conclusions. 
If a statute falls to satisfy any one of these 
three tests, it will not survive a constitutional 
attack brought under the Establishment 
Clause. . .Applying these settled principles of 
constitutional Jurisprudence, we hold that the 
Louisiana statute and Jefferson Parish regulations 
permitting student and teacher prayers in the 
public schools violate the First Amendment.5 
The appellate court applied the first part of the Lemon 
test, the purpose prong, as it looked at the "plain 
language" of both Section B and the local school board 
guidelines. It found that In both Instances the language 
"makes apparent their predominately religious purpose."6 
Indeed, since prayer is a primary religious 
activity in itself. Its observance in public 
school classrooms has, if anything, a more 
obviously religious purpose than merely displaying 
a copy of a religious text in the classroom7. . . 
Furthermore, the legislature's provision for 
excusing students who do not desire to participate 
in the daily prayer session betrays its 
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recognition of the fundamentally religious 
character of the exercise."8 
In its application of the second part of the Lemon 
test, the effect prong, the appellate court did not 
acquiesce to the district court's reasoning that prayer 
could address secular topics. 
This analysis is disingenuous. Prayer is an 
address of entreaty, supplication, praise or 
thanksgiving directed to some sacred or divine 
spirit, being, or object. That it may contemplate 
some wholly secular objective cannot alter the 
inherently religious character of the exercise.9 
Nor would the court accept the defendants' claims that 
both the statute and guidelines were neutral and that 
because the prayer was voluntary, it involved no question of 
constitutionality. 
That the challenged provisions do not prescribe 
any particular form of prayer and do not promote 
some sectarian religious practice is without 
constitutional significance.10 
The court ruled that the statute and guidelines "promoted a 
religious practice," and thus contraindicated the necessity 
for neutrality.11 
Even though the statute and guidelines had not yet been 
implemented, the appeals court ruled that the application of 
the third prong, the test for excessive entanglement, would 
probably prove the existence of entanglement. It foresaw 
that since the prayer would be conducted on school grounds, 
during the school day, school personnel would be required to 
monitor and supervise to ensure that the prayer was, in 
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fact, voluntary and that it did not exceed the specified 
length of time.12 
The statute and the Jefferson Parish School Board 
regulation failed to pass constitutional muster on the three 
grounds of purpose, effect, and entanglement. The appellate 
court reversed and remanded the decision. 
On March 11, 1982, the United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit, ruled on Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. 
Lubbock Independent School District.13 Similar to the Karen 
B.. case, this was an appeal of a district court decison 
which had upheld the constitutionality of a school district 
policy which permitted the voluntary gathering of students 
for religious purposes. The meetings could occur either 
before or after school, under the supervision of school 
officials. 
The Lubbock School District had a long history of 
religious practices, which included the use of the schools'' 
public address systems to read Biblical passages, teacher 
led prayer, silent prayer, and the distribution of Gideon 
Bibles to fifth, and sixth grade students. Complaints 
against the school district had been filed as early as 1971. 
An attorney for the Lubbock Civil Liberties Union filed a 
complaint against such practices. The district responded by 
drawing up an informal policy concerning religious activity. 
This new policy professed neutrality on the part of 
personnel, prohibited religious activity, religious 
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speakers, and the distribution of Gideon Bibles. However, 
the district continued largely to ignore its own directive. 
When the activities continued, formal complaints were filed 
in December 1978. In response to these complaints, the 
school district Issued a second policy in January 1979, and 
in August of the same year, followed it up with a set of 
guidelines for implementation.14 Nevertheless, in spite of 
the adoption of the 1979 policy and guidelines for its 
subsequent implementation, the contested activities 
continued. Nor did the district attempt to cover them up.15 
[T]he District apparently had no intention of 
altering the practices about which the LCLU had 
complained as early as 1971 but rather instructed 
that the practices should be student rather than 
teacher initiated.16 
The Civil Liberties Union brought its suit in September 
1979. Following pre-trial activities, the case was finally 
placed on the court docket. This brought significant 
reaction on the part of the district. In an attempt to 
counter the plaintiffs'' charges, the district once again 
adopted a new policy for student meetings, claiming it was 
religiously neutral. This new policy was included in the 
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union's challenge. 
Because there had been no abatement of religious 
activities, the district court ruled that the practices 
listed In the plaintiffs' complaints were unconstitutional 
and were an infringement of students' first amendment 
rights. This applied to both the 1971 and the 1979 
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policies. However, It ruled that a section In the most 
recent 1980 policy was facially neutral.17 
The court specifically noted that Paragraph 4 was 
not unconstitutional as it permitted, student 
groups of all types to gather at the school as 
long as attendance at meetings was voluntary.18 
Because the school board had adopted a new policy, the court 
ruled that the challenges to the practices of the previous 
policies were moot; moreover, the district had demonstrated 
"good faith" by issuing the new policy. It therefore ruled 
in favor of the defendants. 
The Civil Liberties Union appealed that part of the 
district court's ruling which applied to voluntary meetings. 
In addition, it objected to the refusal of the district 
court "to enjoin the District from continuing past practices 
and current unconstitutional practices under Paragraph 4."19 
In Lubbock. the plaintiffs charged a violation of the 
establishment clause. The defendants countered by claiming 
that to deny students an opportunity to gather voluntarily 
before or after school for purposes of prayer was to deny 
them the right to free expression of their religion. "We 
are thus faced with the classic first amendment 
confrontation."20 To resolve the confrontation, the 
appeals court chose: 
[a] review of the underlying concerns and 
application of the methodology established for 
examination of first amendment violations [which] 
provide a conceptual framework in which we may 
examine the District's policy on supervised 
student religious meetings.21 
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The court established the groundwork for the precedents 
that required neutrality in the public schools by citing 
Everson vT Board of Education, 330 u.s. l, 111 inois ex rel 
McCollum v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203, and Roemer v. 
Board of Public Works. 426 U.S. 736, among others.22 it 
pointed out that it was these very cases which provided the 
underlying framework for declaring many religious activities 
in the public schools unconstitutional.23 
Because of the mandate to enforce neutrality in the 
schools, "the question becomes how to determine whether a 
school has impermissibly participated in an establishment of 
religion."24 The method which the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit selected to make that determination was the 
Lemon test. 
If the answer to al 1 three questions is in the 
affirmative, the policy or practice does not 
impermissibly provide for an establishment of 
religion and is thus constitutional. Ideally, 
too, affirmative answers to the above questions 
will alleviate the special concern that the public 
schools, Important as the "the most pervasive 
means for promoting our common destiny," are being 
utilized to promote an establishment of 
religion.25 [emphasis in original] 
The court analyzed Paragraph 4 of the policy which 
allowed meetings to occur If attendance was voluntary to 
determine if it had a secular purpose. It found that in 
spite of the district's claim of secular purpose,26 
Paragraph 4 was Indeed suspect. In context, the paragraph 
was contained in "the middle of a policy concerned with 
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religious activities in the s c h o o l s ."27 -phe language of the 
paragraph itself stipulated "religious" purposes in addition 
to other secular purposes. The court concluded that the 
purpose of the policy was to allow groups to meet for 
re 1i gious purposes. 
The District's Justification for the religious 
meetings, the development of leadership and 
communicative skills, cannot withstand scrutiny 
when these goals can be attained through 
non-religious student associations.28 
The appellate court's analysis continued as It 
addressed the effect question. 
The primary effect test necessarily inquires 
whether the consequence of the District's policy 
is to place its Imprimatur upon religious 
activity.29 
In note 15, the court pointed out that although the district 
asserted that its policy advanced no particular religion, 
the question was not one of a particular religion, but 
whether "religion is fostered."30 The court pointed out 
that the time of the meetings, either at the beginning or 
end of the school day, inferred that the district recognized 
those meetings as part of the extracurricular program and 
implied tacit acceptance and approval of such meetings.31 
The court also considered the ages of the children Involved. 
[T3he possibility that they [the children] would 
misapprehend the involvement of the District In 
these meetings, renders the primary effect of the 
policy impermissible advancement of religion.32 
The district had steadfastly maintained that because 
all meetings were voluntary and occurred after regular 
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hours, there was no implied approval of such meetings. The 
court disagreed, noting two significant factors: <1> the 
time of the meetings was very close to the regular day; and 
<2> the district provided supervision of such meetings.33 
The court resorted to existing case law to deny the 
district's claim, citing Enael. Schempp. as quoted in Karen 
the fact that the Texas compulsory attendance laws provided 
a captive audience "for the religious activities, whether 
the buses have run or the school has 'officially' begun."35 
An examination of Paragraph 4 In the context of 
the overall policy of which it is an integral part 
demonstrates that Its authorization of voluntary 
meetings held before or after school (whether or 
not the buses have run) has the primary effect of 
advancIng re 11gi on.36 
Finding that the primary effect of Paragraph 4 was to 
advance religion, the court applied the final test, that of 
excessive entanglement. The district's policy stated that 
meetings would be supervised. The court pointed out this 
would result in excessive entanglement. "This admitted 
supervision is precisely the type of entanglement struck 
down in Brandon and Karen B. as impermissible 
entanglement."37 
The court also refused to recognize the district's 
argument that no entanglement could result from the policy 
because no monies were Involved. 
Here, the use of the District's facilities and its 
continuing supervision of the religious meetings 
, 653 F.2d at 902.34 The court also emphasized 
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create the entanglement which leads to an 
impermissible establishment of religion.38 
Although the District had maintained that 
Paragraph 4 provided for free exercise rights, the court 
decided the case on the establishment clause. 
In summary, we find a difficult situation 
confronting this court. . .We are faced with an 
explicit authorization of religious meetings 
contained in the context of a policy setting forth 
guidelines on religion in school. Additionally, 
the school implicitly uses the compulsory 
education laws to provide the students and 
explicitly agrees to provide supervision for the 
meetings. Our examination of Paragraph 4 
according to the purpose, effect and entanglement 
analysis articulated by the Supreme Court 
indicates that, as to all three questions, 
impermissible establishment of religion exists.39 
Another case in which a moment of silence statute was 
challenged Is Beck v. McElrath. 548 F.Supp. 1161 <1982). The 
1982 Tennessee statute stated: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day 
in all grades in all public schools, the teacher 
in charge of the room in which such class is held 
shall announce that a period of silence not to 
exceed one minute of duration shall be observed 
for meditation or prayer or personal beliefs and 
during any such period, silence shall be 
maintained. 1982 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 899, sec. 1 
(amending Tenn. code Ann. sec 49-1922).40 
The defendants argued vigorously that the intent of the 
statute was to protect the right of free exercise—that 
there had never been a prohibition of prayer in public 
schools, and that nowhere did it say that a state must be 
anti-religion. The court, however, noted that the question 
was not one of Infringement upon religious rights. "To the 
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contrary, it is claimed that the state has attempted to 
promote, rather than Inhibit, religious exercises in the 
public schools."41 
The court analyzed the statute in terms of the purpose 
and effect questions. One difference In the use of the test 
occurred in this case however. Rather than citing Lemon 
directly, the Judge cited Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Nvgulst. 413 U.S. 756, 774 as it had 
depended upon Lemon. The court emphasized that the statute 
did not call merely for a moment of silence, but rather a 
moment of silence to be used for "'medi tat ion or prayer or 
personal beliefs."1,42 Although two of the terms were 
secular—meditation and personal beliefs— 
Individual terms within a statute are not to be 
construed in a purely abstract sense or in a 
vacuum, however. As all terms in the statute are 
viewed together and accorded reasonable meaning, 
it Is difficult to escape the conclusion that the 
legislative purpose was advancement of religious 
exercises in the classroom.43 
Because of the ambiguous nature of the statute, the 
court investigated the legislative intent of its sponsors. 
The legislative history, in which the Senate defeated an 
amendment calling for the deletion of the word "prayer" by a 
vote of 24 to 7, clearly indicted the statute. "The 
overwhelming intent among legislators supporting the bill, 
including the sponsors, was to establish prayer as a daily 
fixture in the public schoolrooms of Tennessee.1144 The 
court also considered the arguments of Senators Henry, 
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Dunavant, and Davis as it concluded that the purpose of the 
statute was to return prayer to Tennessee schools.45 The 
defendants, like the defendants in Lubbock4^, argued that 
the statute was constitutionally sound because participation 
was voluntary.47 The court disagreed. 
[A] mere cursory reading of the legislative 
history discloses that the purpose for which the 
statute was enacted remained constant—the 
legislature sought to set aside a time for daily 
religious exercises in public schools.48 
Relying on the legislative intent, the court found that the 
statute failed the purpose test. 
The next facet Investigated was that of primary effect. 
"The court is convinced that the primary effect of this 
statute must be the promotion of religious exercise."49 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court addressed the 
legislature's lack of guidelines for Implementation. 
Without these guidelines, the statute could be implemented 
in a variety of methods varying from one classroom to 
another. One teacher could call for a moment of silence, 
another for meditation, and still another, specifically for 
prayer. "Unavoidably, students will understand that they 
are being encouraged, not only to be silent, but also to 
engage in religious exercise."50 
The Judge ruled that because the purpose and effect 
tests so clearly indicated a violation of the establishment 
clause, the court was not required to address the 
possibility of excessive entanglement.51 
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In light of conclusions discussed above, a 
detailed examination of potential administrative 
entanglements under the third prong of the Nvauist 
[Lemon] test Is not necessary here. . .Varying 
degrees of potential entanglement are as difficult 
to enumerate as are potential effects, and appear 
to be no less problematical.52 
The court cited Everson. "the state lacks power either to 
handicap or to favor religions,"53 as it reached its 
decision. 
The statute before the court was not intended to 
be a neutral measure, and it cannot be viewed as 
such. It is therefore violative of the 
Establishment Clause.5"4 
The 1981 New Mexico legislature adopted a statute which 
authorized local school districts to "Implement a daily 
moment of silence in public schools within the local school 
district," sec. 22-5-4.1, NMSA 1978.55 jerry Duffy, on 
behalf of himself and his son, a student in the Las Cruces 
schools, challenged the constitutionality of the act. 
Specifically, the act provided that: 
Each local school board may authorize a period of 
silence not to exceed one minute at the beginning 
of the school day. This period may be used for 
contemplation, meditation or prayer, provided that 
silence is maintained and no activities are 
undertaken.56 
Before reacting to Las Cruces policy, the court 
launched an investigation into the purpose of the state 
statute, examining the history, background, and plain 
language of the act. It found that the sponsors of the 
legislation lived In the county in which Las Cruces was 
located, and one of them had requested that the attorney 
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general provide a model bill which would permit prayer in 
the schools.57 
The court found that the purpose of the statute was 
religious, and then undertook an analysis of the actions of 
the Las Cruces School Board in passing a policy authorized 
by the statute. Its ultimate conclusion was that "the 
legislative purpose of the Board was to provide a program of 
prayer in District schools."58 Having reached this 
determination, It examined the discussions occurring at 
board meetings during the 1981 summer. "During these 
meetings, only the religious aspect of the statute was 
discussed."59 At the time of the trial, when the defendants 
argued that the purpose of the moment of silence was to 
"enhance discipline and instill in the students the 
' Intel 1 ectual composure1' necessary for effective learning," 
the Judge responded, "These Justifications are clearly the 
product of afterthought. . .Their purpose was to institute a 
devotional exercise in public school classrooms."60 
The court decided the issue of effect next. 
The ill lies in the public's perception of the 
moment of silence as a devotional exercise. If 
the public perceives the State to have approved a 
dally devotional exercise in public school 
classrooms, the effect of the State's action is 
the advancement of religion.61 [emphasis in 
original] 
Employing reasoning similar to that employed by the 
court in Beck. the Judge questioned the ability of children 
to distinguish between terms such as "meditation," "prayer," 
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and "contemplation." He also noted children's needs to 
conform to peers.6^ judge could find no 
ts]ignifleant educational benefits from the moment 
of silence as implemented by the defendants. . . 
The marginal benefits that may be realized are 
clearly overweighed by the danger in the public's 
perception of the moment of _silence as a 
State-approved religious activity.63 
The judge further ruled that the policy fostered 
excessive entanglement. 
The exercise is undertaken on school grounds 
during school hours. Teachers have the duty to 
maintain silence by all of the students, and to 
ensure that no other activities are undertaken. 
The Superintendent of Schools and ultimately the 
Board are responsible for seeing that Board 
policies, including the moment of silence, are 
carried out in the classrooms of the District.64 
Additionally, the Judge Included a discussion about the 
matter of political divisiveness, attesting to the impact on 
the community and the school system itself. More Important, 
however, was the impact of such di visiveness on the board 
members themselves. A bond issue was pending at the time 
the policy was introduced, and many board members were 
concerned that failure to pass such a policy would hurt the 
chances of voter endorsement for the bond issue.65 Thus 
pressure was applied on board members to vote favorably for 
the moment of silence policy. 
To substantiate its conclusions, the court relied on 
the same cases that have been cited in other decisions; 
McElrath, 548 F.Supp. 1161, Committee for Public Education 
I l l  
V. Nvqvlgt, 413 U.S. 756, and Lemon V. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 
602. 
Based on the Court's findings of fact, it must be 
concluded that the legislature had no clearly 
secular purpose in adopting the law. Having 
failed the first test of the Lemon v. Kurtzman 
analysis, the law must be deemed unconstitutional 
irrespective of the two remaining tests. . . .The 
plain language of the statute [specifically the 
use of the word "prayer"] Indicates a religious 
purpose.66 
The court also denied the defendants'" claims that the 
statute was an accommodation of students' religious 
freedom.67 
The Court concludes that sec 22-5-4.1 was enacted 
and Implemented for a religious purpose by the 
Legislature and the Board. The statute Is 
therefore unconstitutional and its implementation 
i11egal.6S 
Even though the court had stated it was not necessary 
to apply the entanglement or effect tests, it chose to 
include a brief discussion of each. Did the statute advance 
rellglon? 
Here the state has chosen to sponsor and actively 
involve itself in the matter of prayer. . . .By 
authorizing a time for prayer in the classrooms, 
the defendants have placed the imprimatur of the 
state on that religious activity. In so doing, 
they have Impermissibly advanced religion. . . . 
It is clear, therefore, that the primary effect of 
sec. 22-5-4.1 and Its implementation is the 
advancement of religion. The statute is 
unconstitutional and illegal.69 
Several factors- supported the contention that the state 
was Involved in excessive entanglement. Among them were 
"time, place and atmosphere for prayer."70 Even more 
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compelling, however, was the responsibility of the 
superintendent and board to enforce and monitor policy 
implementation.71 Further was the Issue of political 
divisiveness, for great potential for problems existed.72 
Hence, 
The Court therefore concludes that sec 22-5-4.1 as 
implemented by the defendants causes excessive 
entanglement between church and state. The 
statute is therefore unconstitutional and 
i11egal.73 
The court felt compelled to ensure that the 
legislature did not immediately turn around and enact a 
moment of silence statute that would couch its desires 
in seemingly secular language with a hidden sectarian 
purpose. "The Court must, therefore, prohibit any 
future Implementation of the moment of silence."74 
If the defendants are not so enjoined, the moment 
of silence issue could well be brought before them 
again. But the defendants would be more careful 
to disguise their purpose the next time. With a 
wink and a nod, they could discuss the secular 
purposes for a moment of silence, and prohibit any 
mention of the school prayer issue. Having 
avoided the factors which lead the Court to rule . 
against them In this case, they could reinstate 
the moment of silence.75 
With that, the court granted permanent injunction, 
declaratory judgment, and final Judgment against the statute 
and the Las Cruces Board of Education policy which 
implemented it.76 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court in Nartowlcs y, Clayton County School 
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JDlsLt,77 The charges against the school district were 
numerous and included allowing a religious group to hold 
faculty sponsored meetings on school grounds; promoting 
religion in student assemblies; using the public address 
system and school bulletin boards for religious 
announcements; and allowing the posting of religious 
signs.78 
The district court had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs 
on all four counts. The school district appealed the 
Injunctions against two of them—allowing a religious group 
to meet on school grounds, and the injunction which 
prohibited the use of the public address system. It 
accepted the injunctions against the two remaining 
activities, conceding that they were not permissible under 
law. The appellate court applied the Lemon test to 
determine that the two contested activltes were in violation 
of the establishment clause.79 
When the district court had addressed the first concern 
about the Youth for Christ club, it ruled that the club had 
no secular purpose; therefore, it failed the test of 
purpose. It elected not to address the second and third 
prongs.SQ The appellate court ruled this might be too 
narrow an Interpretation, and chose to strengthen the 
argument by including evidence which would prove whether the 
meetings of the club advanced religion. The court found it 
necessary to review the history of the club in order to 
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determine whether the club meetings had a primary effect of 
advancing religion. Briefly summarizing the court's 
findings, each meeting Incorporated a devotion, and 
sometimes, a prayer. The club had existed for eleven years 
and the assistant principal scheduled the meetings and 
announced them.81 Because the evidence so clearly indicated 
that the school accommodated religion by allowing the club 
to meet, the appellate court chose not to concern Itself 
with excessive entanglement. 
When the evidence above is evaluated in light of 
the district's apparent support of religious 
assemblies, religious signs, and announcements of 
church sponsored activities via bulletin boards 
and public address systems. . . we are unable to 
conclude that the district court abused Its 
discretion in Issuing the preliminary 
injunction.82 
However, both courts agreed that the availability of 
the public address system and school bulletin boards 
constituted excessive entanglement. No guidelines existed 
to determine which announcements about church-sponsored 
activities could be made. School officials were required to 
monitor and decide which activities were secular. Their 
Involvement in the decision making process made excessive 
entanglement unavoidable.83 With the amount of available 
evidence, the appellate court had no difficulty affirming 
the district court's injunctions. 
An Oklahoma case was heard In the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit on June 26, 1985.84 At issue was an 
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Oklahoma statute that permitted voluntary prayer,85 and a 
school district policy that allowed religious meetings 
during the school day and the distribution of Bibles on 
school property. 
Action commenced after plaintiffs. Bell and McCord 
learned that each Thursday morning, religious meetings were 
being held prior to the beginning of classes. Upon receipt 
of the complaint, the superintendent conducted an 
investigation. This Investigation revealed that teachers 
were providing supervision for, as well as participating in, 
religious activities. It further disclosed that posters and 
announcements advertised the meetings, speakers were Invited 
at the request of both students and teachers (although it 
was primarily from teachers), and the content of the 
programs Included prayer, song, and testimony. The 
superintendent ordered the meetings discontinued pending 
board act ion.86 
At the time the school board met to consider the 
complaint, it voted to allow the continuation of the 
meetings even though two members expressed concern about 
their legality. Nor was any legal advice sought in order to 
receive an opinion regarding the constitutionality of "the 
meetings.87 
Following the filing of their suit, the plaintiffs were 
harassed, with a mysterious fire destroying the home of 
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plaintiff Bell. Their children were ridiculed and 
ostracized, and eventually both families left Little Axe.88 
The board adopted an equal access policy, which the 
plaintiffs promptly included in their suit, in an evasive 
attempt to avoid curtailing the club meetings or revealing 
their religious nature.89 jn March 1983, the district court 
"enjoined the meetings, but held the [new] policy facially 
const i tut i ona1."90 
When the appellate court analyzed the policy, it 
determined that It had created a "limited forum for the 
benefit of its students and employees."91 Once it reached 
that conclusion, the court found It necessary to review the 
meetings of the Son Shine Club in light of the establishment 
clause. For this purpose, the Lemon test was applied. 
Several actions of the school district were 
scrutinized in order to determine what its real motives 
were. It claimed that the challenged policy was a 
clarification of an earlier unwritten equal access policy. 
Yet several witnesses, Including several 
defendants, testified that either they were 
unaware of a prior policy or did not know what the 
policy provided.92 
Furthermore, changes In the meeting format occurred. 
The teacher role changed from active participation to one of 
observation and monitoring. A student committee assumed 
responsibility for procuring speakers.93 The appellate 
court noted that following Implementation of the policy, 
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"seven months after . the district court enjoined the 
meetings, the school administration required the Junior high 
classes to attend a religious assembly. . ."94 speaker 
was an evangelist who testified of God's love, and Invited 
students to a revival. "He also offered them autographed 
pictures, literature, and records. . ."95 
In response to a request for a contempt citation which 
charged that the assembly violated the injunction, the 
district attempted to Justify its behavior by claiming the 
assembly was "cultural." It attempted to subvert the 
district court's statement concerning the impact that time 
of day could have on determining the religious nature of a 
meeting to its own benefit. The final defense against the 
contempt citation was the district's claim that the nature 
of the Son Shine Club meetings, which had been enjoined, was 
very different from the assembly and thus exempt from the 
injunction.96 
The District's blatant disregard for the clear 
import of the court's injunction convinces us that 
the District's "pre-eminent purpose" in permitting 
these meetings to be held was religious in nature 
and that the policy was adopted to conceal that 
purpose. 
« * • 
[However,] because of our concern that our 
decision rest on a firm conviction that the 
District's actions violated the Establishment 
Clause, we also consider the District's action in 
light of the second and third elements of the 
tripartite test.97 
The next step was to apply the test for effect. The 
court cited Wldmar 454 U.S. 263, and Bender. 741 F.2d 697, 
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two cases which addressed the question of age as a 
requirement for appropriate declsons concerning neutrality 
of rellgion. 
Elementary school children are vastly more 
impressionable than high school or university 
students and cannot be expected to discern nuances 
which indicate whether there is true neutrality 
toward religion. . .98 
The makeup of the Son Shine Club meetings was examined 
to determine effect, Just as it had been analyzed to 
determine purpose. Several teachers attended the meetings, 
even though the policy called for only one teacher monitor. 
"CTlhe attendance by several teachers unmistakably expressed 
their personal endorsement of religion, and, by implication, 
that of the school."99 Even though the meetings occurred 
before school, most students arrived between 8:00 and 8:10 
a.m., and those who did not attend the Son Shine Club 
meeting were forced to remain outside. Meetings were 
advertised in the halls, and students not participating knew 
of the meetings. 
These considerations reveal that meetings of the 
Son Shine Club conferred an imprimatur of state 
approval on religion in the Little Axe School 
District.iOO 
The court disagreed with the district's argument that 
because the meetings were voluntary, endorsement was not an 
issue. 
Nor does It matter that the meetings took place 
before classes actually began. The students were 
under the control and supervision of the school 
from the moment they boarded the school bus.i0i 
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Despite the District's consistent disavowal of 
sponsorship, these individual elements indicate an 
overwhelming aura of endorsement and approval of 
the meetings on the part of the school 
admin 1strat ion.102 
The third and final test was the application of the 
excessive entanglement test. The court considered such 
factors as the need for teacher monitoring, the action 
occurring during the teacher's work day, and the necessity 
for examining the meeting's program to ensure that the 
content did not violate the proscriptions of the policy. 
In addressing the monitoring issue, the court 
commented: 
This would be both appropriate and desirable at 
any other student meeting, but in the context of 
meetings with religious content it impermissibly 
entangled the school administration in 
religion.103 
It expressed similar concerns with regard to making 
decisions about program content. 
Again, while this kind of administrative 
determination might be appropriate for any other 
student meeting, It would require a determination 
by the administration as to whether any particular 
religious content is Immoral, violent, or likely 
to Interfere with the educational process.104^ e 
These and a number of other factors indicate the 
"intimate and continuing relationship" between the 
school and the Son Shine Club.105 
Last, the court examined the possibility for political 
divlslveness and found that It existed. 
Not only was the issue controversial within the 
community, the school board was forced to address 
it In an attempt to resolve these conflicts. This 
only further embroiled local government in an 
120 
issue that had already divided a community along 
religious lines. The district court found 
excessive entanglement Inescapable in this 
context, and we agree.106 
Application of all three prongs showed a violation of the 
establishment clause in each case. 
A class action suit107 was filed seeking permanent 
declaratory and injunctive relief against a West Virginia 
constitutional amendment108 that stated that public schools, 
Cslhall provide a designated brief time at the 
beginning of each school day for any student 
desiring to exercise their right to personal and 
private contemplation, meditation, or prayer.109 
The court relied extensively on testimony of children 
enrolled in public schools,110 
"The parties have exhaustively briefed the Issues 
joined, the record is complete, and the matter is 
now mature for decision on the merits."111 
The court prefaced its ruling with comments which 
indicated the difficulty the Judge was having in putting 
aside his personal beliefs. This bias was not evident in 
other cases. 
It is the duty of this Court to interpret the law 
of the United States, not to make it. . .This 
Court is duty bound to follow the precedent 
established by that Court [Supreme Court] and 
fully intends to do so. . ,112 
The application of Lemon formed the basis for the decision. 
Examination of the legislative history of the amendment 
gave a clear indication that its purpose was not secular. 
Senate and House debate revealed that many legislators had 
made comments which clearly indicated a religious purpose. 
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The Court has scrupulously reviewed all of the 
available evidence reflecting the legislative 
history and has concluded that no reasonable 
individual could reach a contrary conclusion [that 
the purpose was religious].113 
Thus, the court ruled that the amendment failed the purpose 
test. 
To determine if the amendment advanced or inhibited 
religion, the court cited Mav v. Cooperman. 572 F.Supp. 1561 
(D.N.J. 1983).114 in which the district court spent 
considerable time arguing that the posture assumed during 
prayer was the key issue; all people do not pray in the same 
manner or position. 
The May court's rationale is compelling in this 
instant case. . . 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the West 
Virginia provision fails to withstand scrutiny in 
that Its primary effect both advances and inhibits 
religion.115 
The time, place, and manner, (Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. 
Schools. 557 F.Supp. 1013 CD.N.M. 19833) constituted grounds 
for finding the potential for excessive entanglement.116 
The prayer occurred during the school day, the place was the 
school room, and the manner required silence. The amendment 
failed to pass muster on all three grounds. 
Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)117 is the moment of silence 
landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court. 
The history of the litigation is long and involved. 
Action was Initiated by Ishmael Jaffree on behalf of his 
three minor children. Jaffree objected to several 
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activities which were occurring in his children's schools. 
They Included regularly scheduled prayer led by teachers and 
voiced in unison by the children. If the children did not 
participate, Jaffree claimed they were ostracized by their 
peers. He complained to the teachers Involved, their 
principals, and the superintendent. When he obtained no 
satisfaction following his complaints, he petitioned for 
relief.118 At issue was the allegation that several 
Alabama statutes were designed to return prayer to the 
public schools. Progressive legislation over a period of 
years confirmed this allegation: one statute authorized a 
one-minute period of silence "for meditation" (sec. 
16-1-20); a second authorized the same moment of silence for 
"meditation or voluntary prayer" (sec. 16-1-20.1); and the 
third gave teachers permission to conduct a voluntary prayer 
for those students who wished to participate (sec. 
16-1-20.2) . 1 1 9  
In granting a preliminary injunction120, the district 
court found sec. 16-1-20 constitutional, noting, 
It is a statute which prescribes nothing more than 
a child in school shall have the right to meditate 
in silence and there is nothing wrong with a 
little meditation and quietness121. 
The plaintiffs did not disagree with the Judge's finding. 
However, by applying the Lemon test, the court found that 
the other two statutes promoted religious activity.122 The 
intent of each was to return prayer to the schools. 
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When the hearing on merit occurred,123 Judge Hand did 
not reverse his opinion concerning the unconstitutionality 
of the two acts. However, in an unique decision based on an 
in-depth historical review of the first amendment, he ruled 
that the amendment, contrary to prior Supreme Court 
opinions, did not apply to the states, and thus Alabama 
could undertake any religious activity it so chose. In 
fact, he went so far as to state the Supreme Court had been 
wrong in its interpretations of the first and fourteenth 
amendments. 
"This Court's independent review of the relevant 
historical documents and its reading of the 
scholarly analysis convinces It that the United 
States Supreme Court has erred in its reading of 
history".124 
Based on this reasoning, the district court refused to 
grant a permanent injunction. At the same time, it stated 
its position that if the case came back to district court 
from appeal, it would rule on the theory that public schools 
were promoting a religion called secular humanism. In 
addition to investigating secular humanism as an issue in 
the schools, the court would also rule on textbooks that it 
perceived as ignoring the role of religion In schools. 
These textbooks would Include the content areas of social 
studies and American history.125 
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit126 
reversed the district court decision. It applied the Lemon 
test and found both sees. 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 
unconstitutional. In addition, it examined Supreme Court 
rulings regarding the historical intent of the authors of 
the first and fourteenth amendments, and found the district 
court erroneous in its Interpretation of the first 
amendment. 
The important point is: the Supreme Court has 
considered and decided the historical Implication 
surrounding the establishment clause. The Supreme 
Court has concluded that its present 
interpretation of the first and fourteenth 
amendments is consistent with the historical 
evidence.127 [emphasis in original] 
The court cited Karen B. v. Treen (1981) as it recalled 
its previous position that prayer constituted religious 
activity, and thus could not have a secular purpose. "The 
Supreme Court and this circuit have indicated that such 
prayer activities cannot be advanced without the implication 
that the state is violating the establishment clause."128 
The appellate court concluded that the statutes did not 
pass the Lemon test on any of the three prongs. It ordered 
the district court to "enforce an order enjoining the 
statutes and activities held in this opinion to be 
unconstitutional .1,129 
In 1984, the Supreme Court affirmed, without 
discussion, the court of appeal's ruling that sec. 16-1-20.2 
was unconstitutional.130 Thus, the focus in the final 
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case was ..to determine the constitutionality of sec. 
16-1-20.1 which allowed schools to institute a period of 
silence for "meditation or silent prayer."131 Before ruling 
on that question however, Justice Stevens, for the majority, 
reviewed, 
how firmly embedded in our constitutional 
Jurisprudence is the proposition that the several 
states have no greater power to restrain the 
individual freedoms protected by the First 
Amendment than does the Congress of the United 
States.132 
The Court relied on Lemon v. Kurtzman C1971) in 
determining if there had been a breach of the establishment 
clause.133 "It is the first of these three criteria 
[purpose] that is most plainly implicated by this case."134 
A study of the legislative history of the statute 
clearly portrayed the religious purpose of returning prayer 
to the public schools. The high court noted that Senator 
Donald Holmes, sponsor of the bill, had plainly stated at 
the time he Introduced his bill that his purpose was to 
institute prayer in the public schools of Alabama. He had 
repeated this in the district court as well.135 
In its scrutiny of the exact language of sec. 16-1-20 
and 16-1-20.1, the Court found only three differences In 
language. It ruled out two as having no impact on the case 
in point—one dealing with grade level, and the other, a 
change in wording from "shall" to "may." However, the third 
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difference was significant, and that was the addition of the 
phrase "or voluntary prayer."136 
The legislative intent to return prayer to public 
schools is, of course, quite different from merely 
protecting every student's right to engage in 
voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of 
silence during the school day. . . .Appellants 
have not identified any secular purpose that was 
not fully served by sec. 16-1-20 before the 
enactment of sec. 16-1-20.1. Thus only two 
conclusions are consistent with the text of 
16-1-20.1: <1) the statute was enacted to convey a 
message of State endorsement and promotion of 
prayer; or, <2> the statute was enacted for no 
purpose.13' 
The only logical conclusion, then, was that the statute 
was enacted to promote prayer. "The Legislature enacted 
sec. 16-1-20.1 despite the existence of sec. 16-1-20 for the 
sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer 
activities for one minute at the beginning of each school 
day.138 
In order to express his concern that lower courts were 
evading the Lemon test, Justice Powell responded in a 
concurring opinion.*3' He, too, noted the religious purpose 
that had beem admitted by the bill's sponsor. In addition 
he reiterated that neither the district nor the appellate 
court had found any secular purpose. Thus: 
When both courts below are unable to discern an 
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court 
normally should hesitate to find one. . . Nothing 
in the record before us, however, Identifies a 
clear secular purpose, and the State also has 
failed to identify any non-religious reason for 
the statute's enactment. Under these 
circumstances, the Court is required by our 
precedents to hold that the statute falls the 
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first prong of the Lemon test and therefore 
violates the Establishment Clause.140 
In another separate opinion, Justice O'Connor also 
concurred with the majority. She expressed herself 
separately because she wanted to develop her theory of an 
endorsement test, a test that would address the nature of 
endorsement of religon over and above the primary effect of 
the action. This additional test would coincide with the 
Lemon test of purpose and effect.141 
Chief Justice Burger,14^ and Justices White143 and 
Rehnquist144 filed dissenting opinions. The primary reason 
for the dissenting opinions was the failure on the part of 
the affirming justices to consider the intent of the 
establishment clause. In fact, Justice Rehnquist elected to 
analyze the first amendment religious clauses as the subject 
of his dissenting opinion. Having done that, he then 
proceeded to describe the fallacies of the Lemon test, based 
on that analysis. 
The majority decision, affirming the apellate court's 
ruling, however, was based on Lemon. and thus Wallace v. 
Jaffree continued to offer efficacy of the Lemon application 
In religious cases. 
A New Jersey statute <New Jersey P.L. 1982, Ch. 205) 
authorized a minute of silence for "quiet and private 
contemplation or introspection."145 It was challenged by 
parents, their children, and Jeffrey May, a teacher. The 
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parents and children, both religious and non-religious, 
objected to what they viewed as either required 
participation in a religious activity, or endorsement of 
religion. When May, who perceived the minute of silence as 
religious, had refused to conduct such an exercise, school 
officials threatened disciplinary action if he failed to 
comply.146 
The Governor of New Jersey had vetoed the bill 
initially, believing it to be unconstitutional, but the 
New Jersey Senate and Assembly overrode his veto. The 
Attorney General had also expressed his opinion that the 
bill was a violation of the first amendment.147 
The district judge reviewed the history of attempts to 
adopt similar legislation which would have revived prayer in 
public schools. Gubernatorial veto of such attempts had 
occurred in 1969, 1971, 1978, and 1981. There had been 
numerous other bills introduced as well, but these never 
passed the legislature.14® The judge relied heavily 
on witness testimony in reviewing the legislative history of 
the bill. Several of the witnesses testified that on many 
occasions, Assemblyman Zangari, sponsor of the bill, had 
stated his purpose was to return prayer to the schools.149 
Several groups objected to the bill, including the New 
Jersey Council of Churches, the New Jersey School Board 
Association, the American Baptist Churches of New Jersey, 
and the New Jersey Education Association. Each of the these 
129 
groups interpreted the bill as having a religious 
purpose.150 
The bill had been in effect for a short period of time 
when a temporary restraining order was issued, but the 
length of time was sufficient for the court to analyze Its 
impact in the school districts where It was in effect or 
where there was talk of implementation. Reaction to the 
bill was mixed. The community of Sayrevllle reacted 
favorably, probably because it already had a local policy in 
effect which called for a period of silence at the beginning 
of the day.other communities did not fare as well. In 
Princeton, school officials worried about possible student 
disruption and the consequences of not complying with the 
law. In Roosevelt, an eighth grade student refused to bow 
his head or close his eyes. Another student In another 
school district was suspended for refusing to bow his head. 
Parents objected and pointed out the impact of peer pressure 
on children who did not take part in the exercise.152 
The Judge adopted a definition of religion in order to 
analyze the act. 
All religions, according to Dr. Gilkey, have three 
components: <i> each embodies a view of ultimate 
reality—especially as it concerns the human 
predicament and the resolution of the difficulties 
human beings confront as they proceed through 
life; Cii) each religion prescribes a way of life, 
which constitutes a response to the ultimate 
reality perceived by that religion; and <lii> each 
religion with its view of ultimate reality and its 
way of life is embodied in an historical community 
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of faith which links the past, the present and the 
future.153 
He then analyzed various forms of prayer and concluded that, 
"what the minute of silence Bill has done is to mandate that 
all students assume the posture of one traditional form of 
prayer,"15-4 thus precluding others from adopting their own 
form. 
Following analysis of all the testimony, the court 
listed several findings. Two were of particular Importance 
in determining if the bill would pass the Lemon test. In 
one of the findings, it was observed, "The purpose of Bill 
1064 was to mandate a period of silence at the start of each 
school day when all students would have an opportunity to 
engage in prayer."155 In the other finding, it was 
observed, "The purpose of the Bill, urged at the trial, to 
provide a transition from non-school life to school work is 
an after-the-fact rationalization and not the real purpose 
of the Bil1."156 
In applying Lemon. the court found that the bill did 
11 not have a bona fide secular purpose and, in fact, has a 
religious purpose."157 It also found the bill to both 
prohibit and advance religion. "It advances the religion of 
some persons by mandating a period when all students and 
teachers must assume the traditional posture of prayer of 
some religious groups and during which those who pray in 
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that manner can do so."158 The court found it inhibited 
religion in two ways. 
First there are those whose religious practices 
include prayer and meditation but who, as an 
article of faith, believe that the State should 
have no part in religious matters. For them 
mandated prayer is no longer prayer. . . . 
Second, by mandating a minute of silence 
which permits some persons to engage in prayer, 
Bill 1064 prevents other persons from engaging in 
their kind of prayer.159 
The Bill also failed to pass the test of excessive 
entanglement. 
Implementation of the Bill would not involve the 
State in the kind of continued and pervasive 
monitoring of sectarian activities which was 
condemned in Lemon v. Kurtzman. supra. It would 
however, tend to promote divisiveness among and 
between religious groups, another form of 
entanglement.160 
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, that court affirmed the findings of the district 
court in a two to one decision.161 The issue, as the 
appellate court viewed it was, "whether a state may direct 
school principals and teachers to permit pupils desiring to 
do so to observe a moment of silence at the beginning of the 
school day."162 
The third circuit, relying on the recent 1985 Wal1 ace 
v. Jaffree decision, applied Lemon in its analysis. 
However, "because we disagree with the district court's 
analysis in some respects, it is convenient to reverse the 
usual order of discussion of the Lemon v. Kurtzman 
standards." 
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The court did not find the existence of excessive 
entanglement. After extensive examination,164 it determined 
that the moment of silence was not required, but rather 
permi tted. 
"Moreover, the Supreme Court has never held that 
the potential for political disagreement over 
government action accommodating religious beliefs 
is sufficient to trigger the application of the 
excessive entanglement test."!65 
It also disagreed with the district court's finding 
that the statute failed the primary effect test. "[F]or our 
analysis of the effects issue we will assume that silence is 
for many pupils the equivalent of prayer. It does not 
follow, however, that for all pupils that is the c a s e . " * 6 6  
It noted that the statute was 
a limited exception to the general school 
regulations, which for educational purposes Impose 
in schools a structured environment in which even 
religiously-motivated students are required to do 
the school's thing and not their own.167 
In spite of the fact that in order to allow students to 
participate in a minute of silence a teacher was responsible 
for maintaining discipline, 
We hold. . .that a restriction of this kind is 
valid as a legitimate time, place and 
manner. . . .The district court's observation that 
the state has injected itself .into religious 
matters by designating a time and place when 
children and teachers may pray does not in our 
view satisfy the effects test.168 
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Having disagreed with the district court's analysis of 
the entanglement and effect tests, the appeals court reached 
its decision based on the purpose test. If the statute were 
to be found unconstitutional, it would' have to be on the 
test of purpose. "The most difficult aspect of the instant 
case is presented by the legislative purpose feature of the 
Lemon v. Kurtzman formulation."169 The appellate court 
scrutinized the 1985 Wallace v. Jaffree decision to discern 
commonalities. It noted the differences in language, and 
the fact that two other Alabama statutes were involved.170 
While it agreed in part with the district court's reasoning 
as far as the legislative history was concerned, it felt 
that the district had not gone far enough. "We do not 
believe a finding that the religious purpose was to 
encourage prayer over other alternatives, rather than to 
accommodate those wishing to pray, would be sustainable."171 
Thus the question presented by this appeal narrows 
to this: May the state, acting through 
legislature or through a school board or through 
an individual teacher, take action in the school 
setting that, while not endorsing prayer in 
preference to other forms of silent activity, 
provides for a minute of silence for the purpose 
of permitting prayer by those who want to pray.172 
Wallace v. Jaffree did not provide the exact answer the 
court wanted; however, the court noted that the ruling did 
not distinguish between mandatory and permissive moments of 
silence, and that the Alabama statute that was struck down 
134 
was a permissive statute, the same as this court had found 
the New Jersey statute to be. 
Accordingly, because the Supreme Court has 
expressly required a secular purpose when 
considering a constitutional challenge under the 
establishment clause and because the district 
court made a finding that N.J.S.A. 18A:36.4 lacked 
such a secular purpose, we hold the New Jersey 
statute to be unconstitutional under the first 
amendment.173 
Gaylon Clark was a student in the Dallas Independent 
School District when he brought suit against the school 
district for formulating a policy which prohibited religious 
meetings on school grounds immediately before or after 
school.174 Informal meetings had been held in the 1982-83 
school year; however, in 1983-84, the meetings had changed 
to a more formal structure, with a regularly scheduled time 
and meeting place. Clark became the leader during 1984-85 
and actively engaged in prosy letizing for the purpose of 
saving souls. "Plaintiff Clark preached loudly [and]. . 
distributed religious pamphlets."175 
Clark's activity escalated, and when he was advised by 
the principal that he could no longer meet on school 
grounds, he responded that, "he had a higher calling than 
school board policy and that he was going to preach when God 
called him to preach."176 He followed his threat by filing 
suit, asserting his free exercise rights were being denied 
by the school district policy. 
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The court applied Lemon to determine the permissibility 
of the policy in light of the establishment clause. It 
concluded that the policy had a secular purpose because it 
advanced "the constitutional demand of separation of church 
and state.11177 
It passed muster under the effect test as well. The 
policy, while neither advancing nor prohibiting religion, 
"recognizes that such beliefs and customs may be exercised 
on an individual basis without penalty. The policy only 
limits group expression of such beliefs."178 
The policy did not violate the excessive entanglement 
test either. Because it allowed no meetings, no supervision 
was required which could result in entanglement.179 
Lemon directs this Court to conclude that when all 
three tests are met, then the challenged policy is 
constitutional. The Court finds that the policy 
in question here is constitutional under the Lemon 
gu i de1i nes.180 
In each of the preceding cases involving prayer in the 
schools, the courts found that attempts to allow such 
activity were In violation of the first amendment. The 
courts reached these decisions through careful examination 
and analysis of the compelling evidence, followed by 
application of the Lemon tripartite test. However, the 
issue of school prayer is a recurring one. Therefore, 
legislatures and school boards must act very carefully in 
creating enabling legislation and policies to ensure they do 
not advance religion or repress an individual's right to 
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freely practice his religion. Each case must be decided on 
Its own merits. 
BALANCED TREATMENT 
When it appeared that attempts to ban the teaching of 
evolution in public schools were doomed to failure,181 
advocates of religion in the schools resorted to a new 
technique—balanced treatment. Balanced treatment statutes 
state, in general, that instruction in creation science must 
have time equal to the time devoted to instruction in the 
theory of evolution. 
The state of Arkansas enacted such a statute in 1981, 
Act 590, "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and 
Evolution-Science Act." Plaintiffs filed suit on May 27, 
1981182, in which they challenged the constitutionality of 
the act. The plaintiffs challenged on three different 
grounds, but it is only the alleged violation of the first 
amendment clause which will be reviewed here.183 
The district court in the McLean case immediately 
established the criteria for judging the case. "It is under 
this three part test [Lemon] that the evidence in this case 
* must be judged. Failure on any of these grounds.is fatal to 
the enactment."184 
Unlike earlier cases in which fundamentalism was not an 
issue per se. the opinion in McLean began with a succinct 
historical review of the fundamentalist movement. The judge 
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discussed the movement's reactions to such things as 
Darwinism, new religious thought, and social change. 
"Fundamentalists viewed these developments as attacks on the 
Bible and as responsible for a decline in traditional 
values. 1 1The judge further emphasized that "[a] central 
premise has always been a literal interpretation of the 
Bible and a belief in the inerrancy of the Scriptures."!86 
He observed the movement's influence on the teaching of 
biology from 1920 to 1960, when only rare mention was made 
of evolution and Darwin. However, the Russian Sputnik in 
1957 cast a different light on scientific affairs. When the 
National Science Foundation <NSF> assumed responsibility for 
the development of several science curricula, the Biological 
Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS), a grant recipient from 
NSF, developed a biology curriculum. The acceptance and 
popularity of this effort resulted in unrest among the 
fundamentalists. 
CTlhere was again a resurgence of concern among 
Fundamentalists about the loss of traditional 
values and a fear of growing secularism in 
society. The Fundamentalist movement became more 
active and has steadily grown in numbers and 
political influence. There is an emphasis among 
current Fundamentalists on the literal 
interpretation of the Bible and the Book of 
Genesis as the sole source of knowledge about 
origins.187 
The judge continued to trace the movement's concern 
over the nature of the origin of man as he listed the 
several organizations which purported to support the Genesis 
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theory as scientific fact.188 This support, in turn, had 
resulted in the position that there were only two options 
that explained the origin of man: "belief in the inerrancy 
of the Genesis story of creation and of a worldwide flood as 
fact, or belief in what they call evolution."189 
Consequently, "The creationist organizations consider the 
introduction of creation science into the public schools 
part of their ministry."190 
Judge Overton devoted considerable space to a study of 
Paul Ellwanger, a South Carolinian who had prepared a 
so-called model legislative act designed to introduce the 
teaching of creation science into the public schools. 
Ellwanger's actions were Important because the nature of his 
correspondence clearly indicated a sectarian purpose. He 
advised many individuals, legislators as well as lobbysts, 
that the purpose of such legislation was religious—to 
introduce the Genesis belief into the public schools.191 
The result was that a ministerial group persuaded 
Senator James L. Hoisted to introduce the legislation. It 
received no committee hearing and little discussion on the 
floor before passage. It received similar treatment in the 
House of Representatives except it was referred to the 
Education Committee for a brief fifteen minute hearing 
before the enabling vote.192 
In ruling on the purpose prong of the Lemon test, Judge 
Overton had little difficulty In reaching a decision. 
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The author of the Act had publicly proclaimed the 
sectarian purpose of the proposal. . . .The State 
failed to produce any evidence which would warrant 
an inference or conclusion that at any point in 
the process anyone considered the legitimate 
educational value of the Act. . . .The only 
inference which can be drawn from these 
circumstances is that the Act was passed with the 
specific purpose by the General Assembly of 
advancing religion. The Act therefore fails the 
first prong of the three-pronged test, that of 
secular legislative purpose. . .193 
Judge Overton focused on a long discussion of the 
definitions of creation science and evolution science as 
found in Sections 4(a) and <b) as he ruled that the primary 
effect of the Act was to advance religion.194 After listing 
the definitions, he stated: 
The concepts of 4(a> are the literal 
Fundamentalists' view of Genesis. Section 4<a> is 
unquestionably a statement of religion. . .Both 
the concepts and wording of Section 4<a) convey an 
unescapable religiosity.195 
Judge Overton concluded his analysis of the evidence to 
determine effect. 
The facts that creation science is inspired by the 
Book of Genesis and that Section 4<a> is 
consistent with a literal Interpretation of 
Genesis leave no doubt that a major effect of the 
Act is the advancement of particular religious 
beliefs.196 
Not satisfied with the findings to that point, the 
court evaluated the scientific soundness of creation 
science. Relying on expert testimony, the court identified 
the essential characteristics of science.19^ "Creation 
Science as described in Section 4<a> fails to meet these 
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essential characteristics."198 He then went one step 
further. 
Creation science, as defined in Section 4<a)f not 
only fails to follow the canons defining 
scientific theory, it also fails to fit the more 
general descriptions of "what scientists think" 
and "what scientists do."199 
As examples of "what scientists think" and "what scientists 
do," the court listed publications of research and theories, 
and methodology. 
In attempting to find materials which could be used to 
implement a mandated creation science curriculum, Marianne 
Wilson, a science supervisor for Pulaski County Special 
School District, was unable to find any materials not 
"permeated with religious references and reliance upon 
religious beliefs."200 Wilson and her committee concluded 
unanimously that "creationism is not science; it is 
religion."201 Analysis of available creation literature 
disclosed its totally religious nature.202 
The conclusion that creation science has no 
scientific merit or educational value as' science 
has legal significance in light of the Court's 
previous conclusion that creation science has, as 
one major effect, the advancement of 
religion. . . .Since creation science is not 
science, the conclusion is inescapable that the 
on 1v real effect of Act 590 is the advancement of 
religion. The Act therefore fails both the first 
and second portion of the test in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 
745 C1971).2°3 [emphasis in original] 
The court concluded that if the act were to be 
implemented, excessive entanglement was an unavoidable fact. 
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The state of Arkansas had a textbook selection committee 
which would have to monitor textbooks to ensure there were 
no religious references. Teachers would be faced with the 
possibility of questions for which the only source of 
answers was the book of Genesis. Classroom discussion would 
be suspect to religious instruction. 
These continuing involvements of State Officials 
in questions and issues of religion create an 
excessive and prohibited entanglement with 
religion.204 
The court entered a permanent injunction against 
implementation and enforcement of Act 590.205 
The recent landmark case with a long, involved history 
of litigation is Edwards v. Agu111ard.206 The original 
plaintiffs in Agui11ard were educational and religious 
leaders, educational organizations, and parents of children 
enrolled in Louisiana schools who challenged the 
constitutionality of Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for 
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act."20? Following 
the initial complaint, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit Court certified the Louisiana Supreme Court to 
determine if the act violated the Louisiana Constitution.208 
The nature of the debate centered around the authority of 
the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education CBESE) to 
establish and mandate courses of study as opposed to the 
authority of the Louisiana legislature.209 The court 
concluded, after a review of the history surrounding the 
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establishment of the BESE that it had authority to supervise 
and control schools, and to prescribe books and materials, 
but it did not have the exclusive right to do so. It 
interpreted that Article VIII, sec. 1 
plainly and unambiguously recognizes the power of 
the Legislature to provide for, establish and 
maintain a public educational system in Louisiana. 
This power includes the right to select courses of 
study. . .210 
Therefore, the court found that the balanced treatment act 
did not violate the Louisiana Constitution. 
This decision allowed the case to return to the court 
of appeals, which reversed, remanded, and directed the 
district court to address questions of federal 
const 1 tut ionali ty. 
The district court acted quickly and firmly in reaching 
its decision. 
We decline to put the people of Louisiana to the 
very needless expense. . .of a protracted trial. 
We held that the case is ripe for summary 
judgment. Bound as we are by the Constitution as 
Interpreted by the Supreme Court and the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, we declare Act 685 of 
the 1981 Regular Session of the Louisiana 
Legislature to be unconstitutional and enjoin its 
implementat ion.211 
In reaching this decision, the court cited Lemon as well as 
Lvnch. 
Again, this decision was appealed with the result that 
the appellate court affirmed the district court.212 
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.[T3his particular case is a simple one, 
subject to a simple disposal: the Act violates the 
establishment clause of the first amendment 
because the purpose of the statute is to promote a 
religious belief.213 
This court, as had the previous courts, noted that the 
statute said neither creation science nor evolution science 
had to be taught, only that if one were, the other must be. 
"The statute requires the public schools to give balanced 
treatment. . ."214 [emphasis in original] 
The court chose to address only the question of secular 
purpose. "Our decision today requires only that we consider 
the purpose prong of the Lemon test. . ."215 It was clearly 
manifested by the court that creationism was a religious 
belief. 
Specifically we must recognize that evolution has 
historically been offensive to religious 
fundamentalists because the theory cannot be 
reconciled with the Biblical account of man.216 
With this interpretation, the court examined the plain 
language of the act and found it remiss. 
Although the respondents had defended the act by 
asserting that its purpose was to advance academic freedom, 
the court disagreed. "Not only does the Act fail to promote 
academic freedom, it falls to promote creation science as a 
genuine academic interest."217 
The Act's intended effect Is to discredit 
evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at 
every turn with the teaching of creationslm, a 
religious belief. The statute therefore is a law 
respecting a particular religious belief. For 
these reasons, we hold that the Act fails to 
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satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test and thus 
is unconstitutional.218 
The United States Supreme Court reached its decision 
concerning the constitutionality of the Act on June 19, 
1987,219 basing its decision on two points. 
1. The Act is facially invalid as violative 
of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment because it lacks a clear secular 
purpose. 
<a> the Act does not further its stated 
secular purpose of "protecting academic 
freedom.". . . 
<b> The Act impermissibly endorses religion 
by advancing the religious belief that a 
supernatural being created humankind. . . 
Thus, the Act is designed either to promote 
the theory of creation science that embodies a 
particular relgious tenet &£. to prohibit the 
teaching of a scientific theory disfavored by 
certain religious sects. In either case the Act 
violates the First Amendment.220 
The Supreme Court relied on the Lemon test it had 
earlier devised. Before applying it however, the Court 
reviewed the concerns which arise when elementary and 
secondary students are involved. 
While states and local school boards have 
considerable flexibility in conducting public 
schools, "The Court has been particularly vigilant 
in monitoring compliance with the Establishment 
Clause in elementary and secondary schools. 
Families entrust public schools with the education 
of their children, but condition their trust on 
the understanding that the classroom will not 
purposely be used to advance religious views that 
may conflict with the private beliefs of the 
student and his or her family. Students in such 
institutions are impressionable and their 
attendance is involuntary."221 
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The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision that 
the act had no clear secular purpose. It highlighted the 
fact that curriculum guides were to be written for creation 
science but not for evolution science; that discrimination 
against teachers of creation science was prohibited, but no 
such prohibition existed for teachers of evolution or for 
those who refused to teach creation science.222 
CTlhe Act's primary purpose was to change the 
science curriculum of public schools in order to 
provide persuasive advantage to a particular 
religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis 
of evolution in its entirety.223 
In other words, the act's purpose was to advance one 
particular religious theory by changing the science 
curriculum so that it would accommodate it. And because it 
did so, the act constituted an endorsement of religion.22"4 
The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious 
doctrine by requiring either the banishment of the 
theory of evolution from public classrooms or the 
presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects 
evolution in its entirety. The Act violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
because it seeks to employ the symbolic and 
financial support of government to achieve a 
re 1i gi ous purpose.225 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
dissented with the majority ruling. Scalia was concerned 
that the Supreme Court did not accept at face value the 
stated legislative intent of secular purpose.2^6 
It is important that one remembers that these are only 
two cases in the area of balanced treatment, and both were 
heard in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
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However, with the Supreme Court's decision in Aoui1ard it 
would appear the question has been settled for the time 
being. 
SECULAR HUMANISM 
Secular humanism has been at the core of many of the 
complaints about public schools. Christian Fundamentalists 
maintain, that secular humanism is a religion, and that 
public schools are advancing and accommodating it. As a 
result, several cases have been filed alleging violation of 
the first amendment. Unlike moments of silence cases which 
involve a legislative statute or board policy, secular 
humanist complaints usually list objectionable courses of 
study or contest the use of a particular bookCs). 
One such case is Grove v. Mead School District.227 
Plaintiffs had originally challenged the use of the book The 
Learning Tree. 
Appellants contend that use of The Learning Tree 
in an English literature class has a primary 
effect of inhibiting their religion, 
fundamentalist Christianity, and advancing the 
religion of secular humanism.228 
The court quickly determined that free exercise of 
religion was not a factor. As soon as Grove had objected to 
the book, her daughter had been given an alternative reading 
assignment along with the opportunity to leave the classroom 
while discussions of the contested book were occurring. 
147 
"In light of the absence of coercion and the critical threat 
to public education, we conclude that the school board has 
not violated the free exercise clause."229 
Concerned with the question of establishment of 
religion, the court referred to the Lemon test. The court, 
in citing Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Norbera. 
630 F.2d' 850, 854 (1st Cir. 1980), alluded to the fact that 
secular humanism might be a religion. However, Judge 
Wright, who delivered the opinion for the majority, noted: 
The Learning Tree. . .was included in a group of 
religiously neutral books in a review of English 
literature, as a comment on an American 
subculture. Its use does not constitute 
establishment of religion or anti-religion.230 
Judge Canby wrote a separate, concurring opinion 
because he wanted to address the issue of secularism in 
somewhat greater detail. He noted the plaintiffs claimed: 
CTDhat The Learning Tree reflects a set of 
secular, if not anti-religious values—values 
which they denominate "secular humanism"—so that 
inclusion of the book in the public secondary 
curriculum violates this salutary principle of 
neutrality. . . . 
Plaintiffs insist that The Learning Tree embodies 
the philosophy of secular humanism, and that 
secular humanism is a religion.231 
Pointing out the plaintiffs' tendency to denote 
anything not religious as anti-religious, Judge Canby 
analyzed their argument. 
The analytical difficulty with plaintiffs' 
approach is that it tends to divide the universe 
of value-laden thought into only two 
categories—the religious and the anti-religious. 
By adopting this dual 1stlc social outlook, and by 
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denominating the anti-religious half of their 
universe as "secular," plaintiffs erect an 
insurmountable barrier to meaningful application 
of the establishment clause to controversies like 
this one.232 
Extending his argument further, Judge Canby stated: 
If the establishment clause is to have any 
meaning, distinctions must be drawn to recognize 
not simply "religious" and "anti-religious," but 
"non-religious" governmental activity as well. In 
the parlance of Lemon v. Kurtzman. "secular" must 
mean "non-religious." Therefore, plaintiffs 
cannot succeed in demonstrating a violation of the 
establishment clause by showing that the school 
authorities are somehow advancing "secular" 
goals.233 
Even though the judge recognized the impact of the 
Torcaso footnote, he took the opportunity to explain that 
taken in context, it did not establish secular humanism as a 
religion. 
. . .C131 is sufficient here simply to point out 
that plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing 
anything remotely resembling an establishment of a 
religion of secular humanisnv.234 
He then went on to state that the book was secular in 
nature, and there was no entanglement. 
The record is devoid of any evidence that The 
Learning Tree was initially selected by Cassle's 
teacher or subsequently retained by Mead School 
District officials out of hostility toward 
Christianity or fealty to any secularist credo. . 
No such purpose [to endorse or disapprove of 
religion] has been shown.235 
In examining the question of endorsement, Judge Canby 
viewed the book as a whole, and its place within the context 
of the curriculum. He concluded: 
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It Is a work of fiction, not dogmatic philosophy. 
It is one book, only tangentially "religious," 
thematlcally grouped with others In the sophomore 
literature curriculum. . . 
CI Inclusion of The Learning Tree as representative 
of a particular literary genre neither religiously 
inhibits nor Instills, but simply informs and 
educates students on a particular social outlook 
forged in the crucible of black rural life.236 
Nor could the judge find anything in the book that inhibited 
the religious rights of the plaintiffs. 
It is true that The Learning Tree poses questions 
and ponders doubts with which plaintiffs may be 
uncomfortable. Yet to pose questions is not to 
impose answers. Since the first amendment is 
designed as much to protect the former as prevent 
the latter, I cannot conclude, on the record 
presented, the use of The Learning Tree Inhibits 
re 1i gi on.237 
Unlike Judge Canby in Grove v. Mead School Dist.. who 
ruled that the Torcaso footnote did not necessarily make 
secular humanism a religion, the court in Crockett v. 
Sorenson alluded to the fact that it was.238 
The First Amendment was never intended to insulate 
our public Institutions from any mention of God, 
the Bible or religions. When such insulation 
occurs, another religion, such as secular 
humanism, Is effectively established. 
In 1961, the Court recognized the fact that 
secular humanism is a religion.239 
At issue was a challenge to a Bible class offered by 
the Bristol, Virginia, school system. This particular class 
had been taught for over forty years, and sponsorship of the 
course had been under the auspices of religious groups since 
its inception. At the time of the litigation, the 
sponsoring organization was the former Bristol Council of 
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Religious Education, newly renamed Bible Teaching in the 
Public Schools.2"40 
The course itself was designed by the ministerial 
association, which also supplied materials and selected 
portions of the Bible for study. In addition, it paid for 
and supervised the teachers, once it had selected and hired 
them. Students could opt out if they so chose, but the only 
alternatives were study hall or physical education.241 
The plaintiffs contended the course was religious 
instruction, while the defendants claimed it was an academic 
study of the Bible.242 
The judge analyzed the impact of the Bible on art, 
literature, music, law, and history. He closed his analysis 
by saying, "£I]t becomes obvious that a basic background in 
the Bible is essential to fully appreciate and understand 
both Western culture and current events."2,43 
Once the court had reached this conclusion, the next 
step was a determination of how the Bible class could be 
taught so it would not violate the first amendment. In 
searching for a solution to the problem, the court elected 
to use only one prong of the Lemon test. 
In this case I do not think it is helpful to 
engage in an analysis involving all three prongs 
of the test in view of the cases such as McCollum. 
Zorach. Engel and Schempp. which very clearly 
stand for the proposition that the practice of 
religion in the public schools is a violation of 
the Establishment Clause. Thus the appropriate 
inquiry in this case is simply whether the Bible 
teaching program constitutes a forbidden religious 
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exercise (i.e., advances religion) or a 
permissible academic program.2-44 
The judge viewed video taped classes, and reviewed the 
history behind the classes, noting, "it is clear from the 
evidence that the Bible Teaching program was instituted as a 
religious exercise and has continued as such until the 
present."245 Forty years of church sponsorship precluded an 
objective presentation of instruction in the Bible. The 
court ruled that offering the class was an unconstitutional 
violation of the establishment clause.2,46 
Because it recognized the Bible's significant impact on 
western civilization, however, the court sought to define a 
method of instruction, which would allow the district to keep 
the course. Citing Vaughn v. Reed. 313 F.Supp. 431 CW.D.Va. 
1970), District Judge Kiser issued guidelines whereby the 
Bristol schools could continue to do so. The key issue was 
return of control of the class to the school system.247 If 
the system adhered to the court's guidelines, the course 
could be retained. 
The Alabama school prayer case, Jaffree v. Wallace. 472 
U.S. 38, spawned one of the most highly publicized, 
religion/education confrontations to occur in the 1980s. 
Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County.24^ 
featured many of the same actors, including several of the 
plaintiffs, and the same district Judge, Judge Brevard Hand. 
As noted previously, in the Jaffree decision Judge Hand had 
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said he would address the issue of textbooks which neglected 
to depict accurately the role of religion in the development 
of America, religion's place in modern society, and a 
purported advancement of the religion of secular humanism. 
In Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County. 
655 F.Supp. 939 (S.D.Ala. 1987), Judge Hand defined 
religion, declared secular humanism a religion that was 
being advanced by the public schools, and enjoined the use 
of forty-four textbooks in home economics, history, and 
social studies that he said either advanced the religion of 
secular humanism or ignored the Importance of religion in 
the study of American history and social studies. He did 
not, however, reach any of the conclusions using the Lemon 
test.249 
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit disagreed with Judge Hand.250 First it disallowed 
the district court's definition of religion. 
The Supreme Court has never established a 
comprehensive test for determining the "delicate 
question" of what constitutes a religious belief 
for purposes of the first amendment, and we need 
not attempt to do so in this case. . .Appellees 
have failed to prove a violation of the the 
establishment clause. . .251 
It then reiterated the validity of use of Lemon. 
The Supreme Court has developed three criteria to 
serve as guidelines. . .Governmental action 
violates the establishment clause if it fails to 
meet any of these three criteria. . .The Supreme 
Court recently reaffirmed the vitality of the 
Lemon test. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball. 
473 U.S. 373 <1985).252 
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All parties to the litigation agreed there was no question 
of religious purpose or excessive entanglement. "Our 
inquiry, therefore, must center on the second Lemon 
criterion. . ."253 
In striking down the district's analysis of the home 
economics textbooks, the appellate court cited Lvnch. 465 
U.S. at 672 and Bal1. 473 U.S. at 393, as it stated that an 
accommodation of religion places that action in violation of 
the establishment clause.254 
In order for government conduct to constitute an 
impermissible advancement of religion, the 
government action must amount to an endorsement of 
religion. Lvnch. 465 U.S. at 681.255 
It further denied that the textbooks endorsed humanism. 
Rather, the message conveyed is one of a 
government's attempt to instill in Alabama public 
school children such values as independent 
thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, 
maturity, self-reliance and logical 
decision-making. This is an entirely appropriate 
secular effect.256 
It pointed out that the books were not "antagonistic to 
theistic belief. . .CTlhe textbooks neither endorse thelstlc 
religion. . .nor discredit It."257 The court futher noted 
that Just because appellees objected to some of the content 
of the textbooks that did not make their use violative of 
the establishment clause. The appellate court followed the 
same line of reasoning that it had with the home economics 
textbooks as it discussed history and social studies 
textbooks. 
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There is no doubt that those textbooks were chosen 
for the secular purpose of education in the areas 
of history and social studies, and we find that 
the primary effect of the use of these textbooks 
is consistent with that stated purpose.258 
The court explicitly pointed out that the textbooks in the 
areas of home economics, history, and social studies were 
all selected for a secular purpose, and thus there was no 
advancement or prohibition of any religion. 
SEX EDUCATION AND COMPENSATORY EDUCATION 
Another case of interest in the continuing battle of 
religion is a 1982 decision, Smith v. Ricci259f Which 
appellants challenged the New Jersey State Board of 
Education regulations which required school districts to 
offer a family life program at the elementary and secondary 
school level. It was contested on two grounds—violation of 
the free exercise clause and violation of the establishment 
clause. 
The establishment clause argument centered around the 
affirmation that a family life curriculum would establish 
and advance the "religion" of secular humanism.260 ^s in 
Smi th. the defendents contended that the curriculum neither 
promoted nor inhibited religion. "The gravamen of their 
Establishment Clause argument Is that the regulation, 
because it is secular, will in its primary effect Inhibit 
religion."2S1 The court pointed out, however, "The program 
is, as it must be, neither antagonistic toward religion or 
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supportive of non-religion."262 The court concluded that 
the regulation did not violate any of the criteria of the 
Lemon test, and therefore was not in violation of the 
establishment clause. 
Compensatory education hardly seems a viable subject 
for religious litigation, yet such was the situation in this 
final case.The Parents' Association of Public School 
No. 16 sued the school system of New York City for its 
attempts to supply remedial compensatory education to 
private elementary school students. 
At issue was a program offered to Hasldlc Jewish girls. 
In the past, such instruction had been offered at the site 
of their private school. Following the Supreme Court ruling 
in Agui1ar v. Fe11on. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), the school system 
sought other ways to fulfill its obligation in providing 
compensatory education to private school students within the 
parameters established by Agu11ar. 
Because people of the Hasidic faith require separation 
from people other than their own, speak Yiddish as the 
principal language, and separate males from females, the 
provision of public school services created very unique 
problems. As a solution, administrators of P.S. 16 boarded 
off one wing of the school, and provided Yiddish-speaking 
female teachers.264 When the district court upheld the city 
plan, the parent plaintiffs appealed. They 
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contended that the Plan invidiously discriminated 
against the public school students and so involved 
the City with the Hasldlc religious sect as to 
constititute an establishment of religion in 
contravention of the First Amendment.265 
Upon appeal, the appellate court applied Lemon. because 
the parents charged specifically that the plan promoted 
religion and created excessive entanglement.266 The first 
prong, secular purpose, was not in question.267 The second 
and third prongs, however, were. 
Discussing the great lengths to which the city had gone 
in order to accommodate the Hasidic religious views, the 
court saw a clear Indication of an endorsement of those 
particular religious tenets.268 
We conclude that Parents plainly demonstrated the 
likelihood that they would succeed in establishing 
at trial that the City's plan failed to pass the 
"primary effect" test and therefore violated their 
rights under the Establishment Clause.269 
In ruling upon the excessive entanglement test, the 
court concluded that the intricate plan developed to 
accommodate the Hasidim would undoubtably create excessive 
entanglement on the part of the government agency. However, 
the fact the plan failed to pass the effect test, ruled the 
entanglement question moot.270 
In this chapter, the writer has analyzed selected cases 
in which activities in the public schools have been 
challenged with charges that the schools either advanced or 
inhibited religion In violation of the first amendment. The 
decisions of the courts in all instances were rendered 
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following application of the Lemon tripartite test. There 
were dissenting opinions in a few of the cases, but these 
were founded upon a differing interpretation of the 
historical intention of the writers of the first amendment. 
In the final chapter, the writer will draw parallels 
from these cases and summarize findings based upon the final 
decisons. More specifically, the writer will recommend 
guidelines with regard to prayer or moments of silent 
meditation during the school day, the place of instruction 
about religion in the curriculum, instruction in creation 
science, and secular humanism in the schools. 
1 5 8  
LIST OF CASES USING THE LEMON TEST 
PRAYER/MOMENTS OF SILENCE 1 2 3 
Karen B. v. Treen X X X 
Lubbock CLU v. Lubbock Sch. Dlst. X X X 
Beck v. McElpath X X 
Duffv v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch• X* X X 
Nartowlcz v. Clavton Cntv. Sch. Dlst. X* X X 
Bell v. Little Axe Sch. Dlst. X X X 
Walter v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. X X X 
Wallace v. Jaffree X X X 
Mav v. Coooerman X* X X 
Clark v. Dallas Sch. Dlst. X X X 
BALANCED TREATMENT 
McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ. X X X 
Aauillard v. Treen X 
SECULAR HUMANISM 
Crockett v. Sorenson X 
Grove v. Mead Sch. Dlst. X X 
Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Commrs. X 
SEX EDUCATION AND COMPENSATORY EDUCATION 
Smith v. Ricci X X X 
Parents Assn. v. Qui nones X 
1 = Purpose prong 2 = Effect prong 3 = Entanglement prong 
* = weighted 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Questions about religion in public schools have been 
raised since America's first settlers, many of whom were 
seeking religious freedom, arrived on her shores. 
Colonial-era churches encouraged the establishment of 
schools so that citizens could read the Bible and thus the 
tenets of Christianity could be fostered and nurtured. 
The religious strife of the immigrants"' European 
heritage, however, was ingrained in their spirit, and the 
Intense desire for separation of church and state persisted 
in the minds of this country's forefathers. This belief was 
firmly embedded In the Constitution through enactment of the 
first amendment. 
Differences regarding the interpretation of the first 
amendment have resulted in a plethora of litigation. The 
conflicts resulting from these differences occur because of 
the nature of our governmental structure. While courts have 
the authority to interpret the law, they possess no 
authority to Initiate legislation. This division of power 
mandates that courts settle such disagreements, the Supreme 
Court being the final arbiter. 
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It is somewhat awesome when we realize that the 
scope of our First Amendment freedoms as well as 
our other constitutional rights ultimately reside 
with the collective Judgement of the nine 
individuals on the Supreme Court. These Justices 
attempt to maintain consistency in applying legal 
doctrine by relying on precedents, but Judgements 
must be made and new doctrine formulated. Since 
Justices are human, subject to biases and social 
influences, the Court's interpretations of 
religious protections have not been totally 
unaffected by shifts in societal sentiments 
regarding the appropriate church-state 
relationship.1 
In order to guard against this inevitable bias and to 
provide consistency, the Justices developed and adopted the 
Lemon tripartite test in a series of cases over a period of 
years. Application of this test in religious cases 
involving the public schools has allowed different courts In 
different Judicial districts to arrive at reasonably 
consistent rulings. 
Chapter four included the analysis of the application 
of this test in selected cases from the years 1982 - 1987, 
years in which a religious upsurge sweeping the country was 
ultimately reflected in the schools. The writer undertook 
this research in order to determine the trend of the courts 
and to make recommendations to school officials to assist 
them in avoiding the adoption of policies or the 
promulgation of activities which might violate the first 
amendment. 
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SUMMARY 
The application of the Lemon test was analyzed in 17 
cases. (See the chart at the end of chapter IV.) Of those 
17, ten cases had as their focus of concern state statutes 
or board policies which specifically mentioned prayer and/or 
moments of silence. Those cases include Karen B.. Lubbock. 
Beck . Duffy. Nartowicz. Bel 1. Walter. Jaffree. Mav . and 
CI ark. The writer studied the attitude of the courts with 
respect to the purpose, effect, and excessive entanglement 
prongs of the Lemon test. The emphasis placed upon 
legislative intent and history was noted, as well as the 
special attention paid to the subject of political 
divisiveness. Also included in this scrutiny was the effect 
voluntary participation had upon the findings of the courts 
in cases in which voluntary participation was an Issue. 
Two cases dealt specifically with attempts on the part 
of certain Christian groups to Incorporate scientific 
creationism into the curriculum. The Judge in McLean 
defined science and proceeded to prove that scientific 
creationism was not a science. The Supreme Court agreed 
when it heard the Aau111ard case, citing McLean in its 
opinion. Of specific note in these two cases, is the fact 
that the laws in question provided that instruction In 
scientific creationism was not required unless instruction 
in evolution was offered as part of the curriculum. 
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Three cases, Crockett. Grove. and Smith v. Board of 
School Commissioners of Mobile County, were devoted to the 
subject of secular humanism. The courts have yet to define 
what specific tenets of secular humanism would constitute 
religious doctrine. Many Christian parents charge the 
public schools with promoting the religion of secular 
humanism, but no court has upheld their challenge to this 
date. There are legal experts who feel that until the 
Supreme Court defines religion for first amendment purposes, 
secular humanism will continue to be a seething issue. The 
courts alluded to the fact that secular humanism either was 
a religion or could be interpreted as one, but no decision 
in any of the cases favored the parents so charging. 
The remaining two cases, Smith v. Ricci and Parents' 
Association dealt with courses in sex education and 
compensatory education In which parents maintained the 
curriculum either infringed on their rights to practice 
their religion or was an attempt on the part of the state to 
advance a particular religion. 
Prior to reporting findings or making programmatic 
recommendations as well as recommendations for further 
study, each of the following research questions was stated 
and answered: 
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Was the Lemon tripartite test applied In its entirety In anv 
of the cases, and/or was anv one prong of the test weighted 
more heavily in providing the basis for reaching a decision? 
This research question allowed the writer to analyze 
how the courts applied the Lemon tripartite test in 
religious cases involving the public schools. Several 
interesting facts appeared when the data were scrutinized. 
In 11 of the 17 cases selected for analysis, the courts 
addressed all three prongs—the purpose test which 
determines if the challenged activity has a secular purpose; 
the effect test which determines if the challenged activity 
advances or inhibits religion; and the excessive 
entanglement test which determines if the activity involves 
the state in excessive entanglement with another agency as 
it administers or monitors the statute or school board 
activity. However, In three of those 11 cases, Duffy. 
Nartowicz. and Mav. the purpose prong was weighted more 
heavily than the other two. 
In 16 of the 17 cases, the courts addressed the issue 
of the sponsors' intent, including the legislative history, 
in order to determine a violation of the purpose test. The 
one case in which it was not considered, the secular 
humanism case of Grove. did not involve intent because a 
single textbook was the focus of concern. 
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In two of the 17 cases, Beck and Grove. the courts 
relied on both the purpose and effect prongs in arriving at 
decisions In which they found the challenged activities 
violated the first amendment. 
Crockett and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile County relied solely on the the effect prong. Note 
that both are secular humanism cases and the complaint was 
that the public schools were advancing the religion of 
secular humanism. That is not to say that the possibility 
for excessive entanglement or the question of purpose did 
not exist, but rather that they were not determining factors 
in reaching a decision. 
Of the two balanced treatment cases, McLean was decided 
after examination of all three tests. The thoroughness of 
the Judge's analysis and application of the Lemon test is 
probably one reason why it was not appealed. The soundness 
of that decision is attested to by the fact that the Supreme 
Court cited it In reaching its decision in Agui11ard. The 
Court addressed the purpose test in ruling in favor of the 
plaintiffs, stating that because the statute required 
balanced treatment, it was not secular in purpose; 
therefore, in effect it advanced one religion over another. 
Political divisiveness was an issue in the excessive 
entanglement question when the courts considered it in Duffy 
and Be 11 ; it was found to be a causal factor in inciting 
community unrest. Political divisiveness was alluded to in 
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Parents Association of Public School No. 16 v. Qui nones 
because the ethnic makeup of the school district was a 
contributing factor in creating school and community unrest. 
The adoption of the Lemon tripartite test permits 
Judges in courts across the United States to apply the same 
standards in religious challenges to public schools. In 
those cases in which a religious practice was being 
accommodated by the schools, the activity was stricken. 
Likewise, in those cases in which the activity proved to be 
non-religious, the challenge was denied. Analyses of the 17 
cases reviewed in this study affirm that the Lemon test 
provided a consistent basis for arriving at the decisions. 
Did the courts shift from lesser to greater accommodation of 
re 11alon in schools? 
At the appellate level, the courts refused to shift 
from a lesser to a greater accommodation of religion in the 
schools in any of the cases analyzed. In addition, those 
district court decisions which were not appealed found that 
schools had not accommodated religious practices. 
The Judge in Walter professed a predilection for 
agreeing with the purpose of the statute In question but 
reaffirmed his sworn oath to uphold the laws and the 
constitution of the land. Thus he put personal feelings 
aside as he ruled that the statute was unconstitutional 
because it violated the first amendment. 
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The greatest indication of accommodation of religious 
activities was In the district court of Judge Brevard Hand. 
In three cases he ruled that the challenged activity was 
within the scope of the law; however, all three cases were 
reversed upon appeal. 
In Crockett the judge searched to find a way to allow 
the school system to continue to offer a non-religious study 
of the Bible. As he did so, however, he clearly defined the 
role of the Bible in western culture from a literary, 
historical, and philosophical point of view as opposed to a 
religious one. 
There appears to be some discontent at the Supreme 
Court level with Lemon and this could lead one to believe 
there might be a shift in direction at some point in the 
future. Justice O'Connor's persistence in attempting to 
develop a fourth prong which would address accommodation of 
religion, and Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and 
Burger's dissents from the majority opinions indicate a 
change is conceivable in the future. This will probably 
become clearer when the Rehnquist Court agrees to hear a 
secular humanism case. 
In order to avoid the charge that an activity was promoting 
religion. did the inclusion of an excusal option or 
voluntary participation provision affect the outcome in anv 
of the cases? 
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An excusal option or provision for voluntary 
participation did not affect the outcome of the courts' 
decisions. In all ten of the school prayer/moments of 
silence cases, the student had the right to choose not to 
participate. This option was frequently used as an argument 
in favor of the activity, when advocates stated it could not 
advance religion because participation was voluntary. The 
courts did not agree with this argument. 
However, in one of the secular humanism cases voluntary 
participation was a deciding factor in permitting the 
challenged activity to continue. In Grove the student was 
given an alternate reading assignment and excused from class 
discussions. This was also true for students in New Jersey 
(Smith v. Rlccl). who were excused from sex education 
classes upon parent request. There was an excusal option 
from the Bible class in Crockett. but this had no bearing on 
the Judge's ruling because he clearly perceived the class as 
religious. 
Thus one can conclude that any type of religious 
activity, even with an excusal option, cannot be Included In 
the public schools without violating the first amendment. 
Collectively, how have the courts ruled on praver In 
schools, including moments of silence? 
Ten cases were analyzed that had as the focus of 
challenge prayer and/or moments of silence statutes or 
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school board policies permitting the same. Of the ten, four 
were decided at the district court level. The plaintiffs in 
Beck. Duffy. and Walter were private citizens and groups 
who challenged the constitutionality of such statutes and 
all prevailed at the district court level. It is of 
Interest to note that in these three cases, excluding CI ark. 
the challenged action involved three distinct 
activities—silent prayer, contemplation, and meditation. 
In CI ark the plaintiff was a student who maintained that his 
rights were being violated by a school policy which 
prohibited prayer and other religious activity on school 
grounds. The defendant school board prevailed In this case. 
Five cases were decided at the appellate level, with 
two being heard in the Fifth Circuit, and one each in the 
Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 
Of the cases that were appealed from the district 
court, the plaintiffs In Karen B.. Lubbock. Nartowlcz. Be 11. 
and Mav all won decisions. Again the plaintiffs were 
private citizens or groups who were challenging the 
constitutionality of moments of silence for the purpose of 
prayer or meditation in the schools. The defendants, school 
districts or state agencies, appealed the decisions to the 
appellate courts which held in all cases for the original 
plaint 1ffs. 
A second Eleventh Circuit decision was appealed to the 
Supreme Court which ruled in favor of the original 
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plaintiff. Wallace v. Jaffree was the only case to reach 
the Supreme Court, thus rendering it a landmark decision. 
As discussed in chapter four, this case entailed a long 
Involved history of litigation. When Plaintiff Jaffree lost 
at the district level to one of Judge Hand's decisions, he 
appealed to the appellate court which ruled in his favor. 
The state of Alabama chose to appeal this decision to the 
Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the court of 
appeals by a six - three decision. 
The Mav case, which was actually argued before the 
Supreme Court in 19872, became moot when the defendants left 
office during the trial and the Court chose not to decide 
the Issues, merely ruling that the defendants no longer had 
standing to appeal. Many legal experts were disappointed, 
hoping to have a second case to strengthen Wal 1 ace v. 
Jaffree. 
This one Supreme Court case, however, makes It clear 
that moments of silence statutes that involve prayer are 
unconstitutional. 
How did the area of challenge. I.e.. voluntary oraver or 
evolution/creation science. influence and/or affect the 
outcome of the decision? 
It would appear, upon analysis of the court cases used 
in this study, that the area of challenge had no 
significance in the final decision rendered in each case. 
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The writer analyzed ten cases in which prayer/moments of 
silence statutes or policies were at issue; two cases 
involved a challenge to balanced treatment statutes; three 
cases focused on a charge that the religion of secular 
humanism was being advanced in the public schools, and two 
cases dealt with sex education and compensatory education. 
In each of the 17 cases, the challenged activity was 
found unconstitutional because it violated the first 
amendment. The Supreme Court rendered landmark decisions in 
prayer/moments of silence issues and balanced treatment 
challenges. While the Court has yet to grant certiorar1 in 
a secular humanism case, its refusal to hear appeals in both 
Mozert and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County allowed decisions from the Eleventh and Sixth 
Circuits to stand, thus in essence establishing them as 
precedent. 
What are the ma.lor trends that appear In secular humanism. 
sex education, and compensatory education cases? 
Several trends appeared In those cases in which secular 
humanism was the issue. As Judge Canby noted in Grove. the 
underlying question is a definition of secular humanism. Is 
secular humanism a religion with established tenets? Or is 
it merely a phrase which is used to encompass those 
non-religious activltes which some Individuals and groups 
perceive as anti-religion? 
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In the three cases in which it was alleged that 
challenged activites promoted secular humanism as a 
religion, the courts determined that secular humanism 
was—or might be—a religion. 1> The court in Crockett 
relied on the Torcaso footnote as it reached a determination 
that secular humanism is a religion. 2) The Grove court 
alluded to the fact that secular humanism might be a 
religion, citing Rhode Island Federation of Teachers in 
arriving at that conclusion. 3) However, the court that, 
by far, has been the most outspoken in its insistence that 
secular humanism is a religion is the Federal District 
Court, Southern District, Alabama, presided over by Judge 
Brevard Hand. The nature of his rulings, including Jaffree 
when he took the Supreme Court to task for misinterpreting 
the first amendment, has rendered his decisions less 
effective than those of other courts. 
The highest courts to which appeals have been taken 
have protected the public schools from charges that they are 
promoting secular humanism to the exclusion of other 
religions. The challenges will probably not cease, however, 
until the Supreme Court agrees to hear a secular humanism 
case. In the meantime, religious groups seeking to find 
accommodation for their beliefs in the public schools will 
continue to pursue this avenue of redress. The Eleventh 
Circuit Court has intimated that the time is appropriate for 
the Supreme Court to intervene in determining whether 
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secular humanism can be defined as a religion when It noted 
that the highest court had never determined what constituted 
a religion for the purpose of first amendment violation. 
Thus the lower courts have been left to grope in the dark. 
FINDINGS 
The focus of concern in this research has been religion 
and the public schools. The following findings have been 
drawn from analyses of the cases selected for inclusion in 
this study of the Lemon tripartite test. 
1> The courts have relied consistently on an application of 
the Lemon tripartite test in ruling on cases that Involve a 
question of religion in the schools. Of the three prongs of 
the tripartite test—purpose, effect, and entanglement—the 
most heavily weighted is the purpose test in which 
legislative history, intent, and language comprise the major 
evidence. 
2> The Lemon tripartite test has guided courts in ruling 
that state statutes and school board policies which 
accommodate prayer in the public schools are 
unconstitutional because they violate the first amendment. 
3) The Lemon tripartite test has been applied consistently 
to all religious cases regardless of the area of 
challenge—moments of silence/prayer, balanced treatment, 
and secular humanism. 
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4) The courts may consider potential or existing political 
divlsiveness when there Is a question of excessive 
entanglement because the divisiveness may create excessive 
entanglement in order to carry out the activity. 
5) Between 1982 and 1987, the years of this study, there 
has been no indication of a greater accommodation of 
religion in the public schools than has previously existed. 
6> An excusal option or voluntary participation for 
students is not permitted in cases in which the activity in 
question is determined to be religious. 
7) No court at the appellate level or above has yet ruled 
that schools are advancing the religion of secular humanism. 
8> The Supreme Court has established precedent in 
prayer/moments of silence and balanced treatment Issues, but 
it has not yet chosen to grant certiorari in a case which 
Involves secular humanism. Appellate court decisions thus 
provide precedent in the latter area where they declared 
schools have not advanced secular humanism as a religion. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In a society as diverse as the United States, where so 
many beliefs comprise the fabric of her religious make-up, 
it Is Inevitable that conflict will arise. The white, 
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ethic of the majority of the early 
settlers is no more. Over the decades, the melting pot that 
America truly became colored the religiosity of this nation. 
Immigrants from Ireland, the middle European countries, 
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Scandinavia, the Far and Middle East, Russia, the Balkans, 
and the Orient brought with them their preferred religions, 
and they established strong, influential churches and 
synagogues that had great influence on the character of 
their neighborhoods and communities. As attempts to 
proselytize became stronger, the clash of faiths also became 
more prevalent. 
Because the public schools reflect their student 
population. It is only logical that attempts to Implant 
particular religious beliefs into -the curriculum occur. 
Parents who do not believe in evolution do not wish their 
child to be exposed to the theory. Parents who believe that 
a day should begin with a prayer, or that food should be 
blessed before consumption, want that action to happen 
within the school. Parents who believe that secular 
humanism is a religion contrary to theirs do not want their 
child influenced by it. 
On the other hand, if parents believe in absolute 
separation of church and state, anything of a religious 
nature Integrated into the curriculum is anathema. This 
includes prayer and scientific creation ism. Furthermore, 
these parents generally do not view the sanctity of the 
individual as a threat to a perceived belief—not everything 
Is absolute. 
When these beliefs are held firmly enough by all of 
those interested in what goes on in schools, the conflict 
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can become so Intense that legal actions result; and the 
nature of this litigation has evolved to a much greater 
Intensity and sophistication during the past decade. No 
longer does one parent with a local attorney sue the system. 
Now religious/public school litigation Involves large 
groups, a bevy of attorneys, many of whom specialize in 
church-state relationships, nation-wide publicity, numerous 
appeals, many expert witnesses, and amicus curiae briefs 
filed on behalf of both parties. Frequently the interests 
of the children become secondary to the real issue of which 
group wi11 preval1. 
For these reasons, the use of the Lemon tripartite test 
remains even more critical. As it realized the potential 
Impact for the future when it ruled on church-state 
questions, the Supreme Court, in its wisdom, recognized the 
diversity of this nation and sought to provide a means 
whereby a question of unconstitutionality based upon first 
amendment violation could be resolved with a certain degree 
of consistency regardless of the court in which the trial 
was occurring. 
This writer, based on her research, concluded that the 
Supreme Court has been largely successful in developing and 
establishing such criteria. This country possesses a vast 
number of courts, both state and federal, with a clearly 
defined order of appeal. Each of these courts is presided 
over by a different judge(s), no two of whom are exactly 
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alike. Some are conservative, some are liberal; some are 
religious, some are nonreligious; some are political, some 
are apolitical—and the gamut continues. Judges' 
Jurisdictions Include urban America, megalopolies, suburbs, 
small towns, and remote, rural areas. Their constituencies 
likewise differ. Populations may be sophisticated, 
cultured, and worldly, or lack this type of exposure. This 
is not to say that one is more correct or better than the 
other—merely that these differences exist. Therefore the 
efficacy of the Lemon test is critical. 
The purpose, effect, and entanglement prongs provide 
Just such structure. The Judiciary may not always agree as 
to interpretation of what each prong Involves, but that is 
what the appeals process is for. Of the 17 cases the writer 
examined, the Lemon test afforded judges in different areas 
of the country the opportunity to ultimately reach the same 
conclusion—there must be separation of church and state and 
this includes public schools. However, the writer concluded 
that the test appeared to be less subject to different 
interpretation and opinions when the subject for argument is 
school prayer/moments of silence and balanced treatment 
Issues. The Supreme Court has resolved these issues using 
the Lemon test, with enough Justices filing separate 
opinions, both concurring and dissenting, to establish clear 
precedent. In examining the various lower court decisions, 
the consistency of the rulings was apparent. 
189 
On the other hand, the writer did not reach a similar 
conclusion with regard to Issues involving secular humanism. 
This is an "umbrella" term, encompassing so many different 
areas that it is virtually impossible to define it to 
everyone's satisfaction. Secular humanism's detractors 
charge that it is religion and is being advanced as such by 
public schools to the exclusion of Christian theology. Its 
advocates state that secular humanism offers a philosophical 
belief in the inherent ability of the individual to make 
decisions for himself. It is not as easy to apply purpose, 
effect, and entanglement to an area for which no definition 
of religion has been rendered. Sooner or later the courts 
must grapple with the potentially explosive issue of what is 
secular humanism, and does it constitute a religion? Should 
the courts actually determine that there are religious 
tenets which make it a faith, and should those tenets 
reflect the many areas that now appear to be harbored by 
secular humanism, the Impact on public schools would 
reverberate across the nation, creating unheard of change 
which could well thrust the schools into a lengthy period of 
chaos as they reorganize their curriculum. In the meantime, 
Judges struggle to come to grips with the nebulous nature of 
secular humanism. 
The writer concluded that the Lemon test will continue 
to provide the framework for analyzing state statutes and 
board policies to determine if activities are 
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unconstitutional. However, she predicts that the 
interpretation of each of the prongs will continue to 
develop, with the possibility of a fourth prong being added 
at some point in the future, that of accommodation that is 
advocated by Justice O'Connor. The Judiciary has expressed 
concern as to just what comprises accommodation, and how can 
such accommodation affect the outcome of a decision. 
The writer foresaw the opportunity for a shift of 
direction with regard to the Judicial interpretation of the 
first amendment. In the past, the Supreme Court has adopted 
a broad interpretation of the religion clauses. However, 
recently appointed Justices appear to be leaning toward a 
narrower interpretation. As they Join with the other 
Justices who also favor a narrower interpretation of the 
first amendment, there could well be greater accommodation 
of religion in the public schools. 
Until such time, however, the Lemon tripartite test 
offers a judicially, constitutionally sound method of 
determining if an activity is violating the first amendment 
clauses. It provides guidelines for school systems, 
legislatures, and courts. 
PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are made for the consideration 
of school officials in the matter of religion in the public 
schools: 
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1) Do not adopt any policy or promote any activity which 
allows students to pray in unison, either verbally or 
silently, even if it provides provisions for voluntary 
participation. All such activities are unconstitutional. 
2) Do not permit clubs or groups which have a hidden 
religious purpose that allows student prayer to meet during 
the recognized school day. Such activities are 
unconstitutional. 
3) Develop, adopt, and implement a policy which provides a 
procedure for responding to challenges and complaints about 
Instructional materials, including textbooks, supplementary 
materials, library materials, and audio-visual materials, 
that allegedly advance or prohibit religion. 
4) Develop, adopt, and implement a policy which provides a 
procedure for responding to challenges that currlcular and 
co-curricular activities advance or prohibit religion. 
5) Develop, adopt, and implement a policy which provides a 
procedure for responding to challenges that particular 
courses or specific course content advance or prohibit 
religion. 
6> Challenges to academic instruction about the Bible and 
about the impact of religion upon historical and cultural 
development may be avoided if these recommendations are 
followed: 
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Employ only certified teachers with strong 
backgrounds in the academic content areas of 
literature, history, and philosophy. 
Select textbooks very carefully. 
Consider curricular department placement; i.e., 
language arts or social studies. 
Implement an on-going evaluation procdure. 
Provide for voluntary student participation. 
Mandate school board control of course content. 
7> In adopting any policy which might be Interpreted as 
having religious tones and thus be suspect, the following 
questions will provide guidelines: 
What is the intent of the policy? 
What type of activity is being planned? 
What is the age of the participants? 
Where will the activity take place and when? 
Is there a history of attempts to instill religious 
activities in the school system? 
The following recommendations are made for further study: 
1) That a study be undertaken of all cases Involving a 
charge of secular humanism to determine the prevailing 
definitions of secular humanism and the impact of the 
definitions on the direction the courts select in arriving 
at a decision. 
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2) That a study be undertaken of the United States Supreme 
Court during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. More 
specifically, are his appointees advocating Increased 
accommodation of religious activities in public schools? 
3) That a study be undertaken of the direct impact of the 
Christian fundamentalist movement on public schools. 
4) That a study be undertaken to determine the effect that 
the addition of an accommodation of religion test would have 
on cases Involving religion in public schools. 
5) That a study be made of teachers', administrators', and 
students' attitudes toward religion in public schools. 
•V'uV 
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V 
1Martha M. McCarthy, A Delicate Balance; Church. State 
and the Schools (Bloomington: Phi Delta Kappa Educational 
Foundation, 1983), p. 8. 
2Karcher v. May, 108 S.Ct. 388 <1987). 
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